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I.

INTRODUCTION

Civil actions seeking damages against public officials are often the only
effective vehicle for challenging the constitutionality of governmental
conduct. As the Supreme Court has recognized, in cases not amenable to
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injunctive relief,1 "it is damages or nothing." 2 Damages actions against
government entities themselves are often unavailing-the federal government
enjoys sovereign immunity;3 the Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions
against state governments and their instrumentalities; 4 and although local
governments are amenable to suit under Title 42

§ 1983 of the United States

Code, which allows for actions against those who, acting under color of law,
deprive another of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws,"5 local governmental entities can be held liable only
for constitutional torts that are the result of their customs, policies, or
practices. 6 Thus, it is no exaggeration that the availability of a damages
remedy against an individual public official will often be the only way to
vindicate constitutional rights.

Yet, confronting actions against public officials seeking damages for
constitutional violations is the defense of qualified immunity, which bars
damages awards against officials-whether state and local officials under
§ 1983 or federal officials in lawsuits brought directly under the Constitution
as authorized by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents ofFederal Bureau of

Narcotics and its progeny 7-unless

the defendant "violate[s] clearly

1.
Federal courts do not have authority to issue injunctive relief based on a plaintiff's
alleged injury absent an appropriate showing that the plaintiff is likely to experience similar
injuries in the future. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983)
(holding that plaintiff could not seek injunction against use of police chokeholds based on a prior
incident absent showing that plaintiff "would have another encounter with the police" and
"either, (1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they
happen to have an encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation or for
questioning or, (2) that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such manner");
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 488, 495-99 (1974) (holding that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to award injunctive relief on allegations of unconstitutional patterns and practices
involving the setting of bond, discrimination in sentencing, and imposing fees for jury trials,
absent a showing of a "real and immediate" threat that the plaintiffs faced injury from these
practices).
2.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); accord, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 814 (1982) ("In situations of abuse of office, an action for damages may offer the only
realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees." (citing Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 506 (1978))).
3. E.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994) (citing Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S.
549, 554 (1988)).
4. E.g., Aldenv. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13, 728-29, 742 (1999).
5.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
6. E.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (citing
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)).
7. The Court first recognized a right to recover damages directly under the Constitution in
Bivens. See 403 U.S. at 397 ("Having concluded that petitioner's complaint states a cause of
action under the Fourth Amendment, we hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money
damages for any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the Amendment."
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established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." 8 Moreover, "[t]o be clearly established, a right must be
sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would [have understood] that
what he is doing violates that right. In other words, existing precedent must
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." 9 The
defense is justified, the Court has written, because of "the risk that fear of
personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit

officials in the discharge of their duties." 10
Qualified immunity has come under sustained academic attack." One
line of argument questions its lawfulness, noting that nothing in § 1983's text
or the prevailing principles of the common law liability of public officials

(citation omitted)). For the Court's account of the course of its Bivens jurisprudence, see Ziglar
v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856-58 (2017).
8.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Although actions against officials
acting under color of state law are brought under § 1983 and Bivens actions are brought directly
under the Constitution, the Court has "deem[ed] it untenable to draw a distinction for purposes
of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought
directly under the Constitution against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 504
(1978); accordWilsonv. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340
n.2 (1986).
9.
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (first brackets added) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741
(2011)).
10. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1866 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)); accord Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 389-90 (2012);
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 409-11 (1997). The Court has added that qualified
immunity is intended to spare defendants the burden of defending litigation as well as the burden
of paying damages awards. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) ("The basic
thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation,
including 'avoidance of disruptive discovery.' There are serious and legitimate reasons for this.
If a Government official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to the formulation of sound
and responsible policies, it is counterproductive to require the substantial diversion that is
attendant to participating in litigation and making informed decisions as to how it should
proceed." (citation omitted) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U. S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring))); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) ("[Qualified immunity's
protections] are not limited to liability for money damages; they also include 'the general costs
of subjecting officials to the risks of trial-distraction of officials from their governmental
duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service . .
[E]ven such pretrial matters as discovery are to be avoided if possible, as '[i]nquiries of this kind
can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.'" (final alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quotingHarlow, 457 U.S. at 816-17)).
11. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45,
45 (2018); Joanna C. Schwartz, The CaseAgainst QualifiedImmunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1797-1798, 1800 (2018).
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extant at the time of its enactment supports the defense. 12 Another line of
argument attacks § 1983's consequences, albeit from different directions.
Some argue that the defense is so powerful that it renders damages actions
ineffective as a check on governmental misconduct. 13 Joanna Schwartz, in
contrast, has argued that qualified immunity is actually ineffective because, in
her view, it too rarely protects public officials from the threat of litigation and
liability to achieve its intended objective. 1 4 Conversely, while scholarly
criticism of qualified immunity is frequent, scholarly defenses of the doctrine
are rare and usually equivocal.

15

The critique of qualified immunity has been

echoed by members of the Supreme Court, where there are indications of

12. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 11, at 88 ("In suggesting that the doctrine of qualified
immunity is unlawful, I do not mean to raise foundational questions about the American legal
order or the basic notion of government under law. Rather, I mean the more modest point that
the doctrine lacks legal justification, and the Court's justifications are unpersuasive." (footnote
omitted)); Schwartz, supra note 11, at 1801 ("Despite the Court's repeated invocation of the
common law, several scholars have shown that history does not support the Court's claims about
qualified immunity's common-law foundations.").
13. For good examples of arguments along these lines, see Karen Blum, Erwin
Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Qualifed Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left
for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 633 (2013); Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas
Corpus and the Rise of Qualifed Immunity: The Court's Ever Increasing Limitations on the
Development and Enforcement of ConstitutionalRights and Some Particularly Unfortunate
Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1244-50 (2015).
14. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 11, at 1803-04 ("I have found, contrary to the Court's
assertions, that qualified immunity is unnecessary to shield law enforcement officers from the
financial burdens of being sued because they are virtually never required to contribute to
settlements and judgments entered against them. I have additionally found that qualified
immunity is unnecessary and ill-suited to shield government officials from burdens of discovery
and trial, as it is very rarely the reason that suits against law enforcement officers are dismissed.
Finally, available evidence suggests that the threat of being sued does not play a meaningful role
in job application decisions or officers' decisions on the street."); Joanna C. Schwartz, How
Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2,71 (2017) ("Although the Supreme Court repeatedly
describes qualified immunity doctrine as a means of shielding government officials from the
costs and burdens of litigation, I have found officers are virtually always indemnified, and that
qualified immunity is rarely the reason that Section 1983 cases end.").
15. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon Jr., Bidding Farewellto ConstitutionalTorts, 107 CALIF.
L. REV. 933, 989-94 (2019) (defending qualified immunity for individual defendants but also
advocating for enhanced entity liability and a less "draconian" formulation of the immunity
defense); Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, QualipedImmunity and Federalism,109
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 31) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstr
act_id=3544897 [https://perma.cc/Q6U3-7JHP] ("To begin, we agree that just because qualified
immunity has federalism implications does not necessarily mean it is worth retaining or that the
Court's cases recognizing it were rightly decided. Congress may have determined that it makes
sense to force states and local governments to be [sic] bear the full costs of the mistakes made
by their officers, even if the officers made reasonable mistakes, or at least acted in a way that
was not clearly lawful .... ").
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disquiet in the citadel. 16 Attacks on qualified immunity have entered the
political realm as well, with the emergence of legislative proposals for its
abolition."

This Article is the first to offer a direct response to the emerging case
against qualified immunity. After this introduction, Part II below defends the
lawfulness of qualified immunity. While acknowledging that the conventional
defenses of qualified immunity wither under scrutiny, Part II offers a novel
justification: Congress's delegation of authority to the federal courts to
develop common law rules for the administration of liability under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.
Part III begins by acknowledging that the conventional justification for
qualified immunity-that it protects public employees against the chilling
effects of personal liability for damages-is largely unpersuasive in light of
the reality that public employees rarely face a credible threat of personal
liability. Instead, they are almost always indemnified by their employers.
Part III then offers an alternative justification for qualified immunity by
examining its incentive effects in light of the ubiquity of indemnification. By
shifting the financial burden of constitutional tort litigation from public
employees to their employers, indemnification encourages public employers
wishing to minimize costs to induce their employees to comply with settled
legal rules. Qualified immunity permits damages liability for violation of such
settled rules, while discouraging plaintiffs' lawyers from bringing a wide
variety of novel damages claims of questionable merit, and it also minimizes
the costs that would be incurred by innocent third parties if public officials
faced unlimited liability. This last point is of special import. After all, the
funds that public employers must devote to the defense of civil rights litigation
and their payment of judgments and settlements comes either from raising
taxes or, more likely, from cuts to public services that are likely to fall
disproportionately on relatively powerless populations, such as the poor and
disadvantaged. This is reason enough for those who are concerned about the
government's ability to finance important public services to see virtue in

defenses that limit the government's exposure to damages liability.

16. See, e.g., Ziglarv. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In
an appropriate case, we should reconsider our qualified immunity jurisprudence."). For a helpful
discussion of the various criticisms of aspects of qualified immunity doctrine that have been
articulated by members of the Court, see Schwartz, supra note 11, at 1798-800.
17. See, e.g., H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. § 102 (2020) (amending § 1983 to abolish defenses
based on a law enforcement officer's good faith and reasonable belief in the lawfulness of the
officer's conduct or the lack of clearly established law).
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IMMUNITY

At first blush, the case against the lawfulness of qualified immunity seems
compelling. Originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,18
§ 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....

19

It is unclear whether this statutory language leaves any room for an
immunity defense. William Baude, for example, in the course of questioning
the lawfulness of qualified immunity, observed that the statute nowhere
"makes any reference to immunity." 2 0 He concluded that "the doctrine lacks
legal justification, and the Court's justifications are unpersuasive." 2 1
Professor Baude's critique destabilizes the basis for qualified immunity
in Bivens actions no less than actions brought under

§ 1983. The Supreme

Court has embraced the defense of qualified immunity in Bivens litigation on
the view that federal officials should receive the same protection from liability
for damages afforded to state and local officials sued under § 1983.22 If
qualified immunity is rejected in § 1983 litigation, accordingly, it presumably

18. As originally enacted, the statute provided:
[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the
jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary
notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ....
An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, Sess. I, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
20. Baude, supra note 11, at 50.
21. Id. at 88. For a similar argument, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559-63 (1967)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
22. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) ("Although this case involves
suits under both § 1983 and Bivens, the qualified immunity analysis is identical under either
cause of action."); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) ("[W]e deem it untenable to
draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials.").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss2/9
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should be reassessed under Bivens as well. Indeed, some scholars have already
made just this move. 23
A.

ProblematicDefenses of QualifiedImmunity

Professor Baude has a point; the legal justifications traditionally offered
for qualified immunity wither under scrutiny.

1.

History

The Supreme Court has frequently utilized the common law context in
which § 1983 was enacted as a justification for qualified immunity. 24 Section
1983 was enacted, the Court has reasoned, against the backdrop of traditional
immunity rules that Congress likely assumed would be applied to the statutory
liability it was creating. 2 5
At the outset, it is doubtful that the text of § 1983 accommodates the
defense of qualified immunity as a kind of historical gloss. In unambiguous
terms, the statute provides that "[e]very person" acting under color of state
law who "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ...

" 26 The Supreme

Court has "stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When
the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last:
judicial inquiry is complete."

27

The plain terms of § 1983 do not seem to leave

any room to read in a historical gloss of common law defenses to liability
inconsistent with the statute's text.
To this, one might respond that the Supreme Court's twenty-first century
methodology for interpreting statutes should not be applied to a nineteenth23. See, e.g., Katherine Mims Crocker, QualifiedImmunity and ConstitutionalStructure,
117 MICH. L. REV. 1405, 1417-20,1448-60 (2019) (discussing the critiques of Professor Baude
and others concerning the statutory basis for qualified immunity under § 1983 and concluding
that there is no adequate non-statutory justification for qualified immunity as a defense to § 1983
or Bivens actions).
24. See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 389 (2012) (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504
U.S. 158, 167 (1992)).
25. See, e.g., id at 383-84 ("At common law, government actors were afforded certain
protections from liability .... Our decisions have recognized similar immunities under § 1983,
reasoning that common law protections "'well grounded in history and reason" had not been
abrogated "by covert inclusion in the general language" of § 1983."' (quoting Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976))).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
27. Barnhartv. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438,461-62 (2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)).
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century statute such as § 1983. There is, however, scant evidence that the
interpretive methodology familiar to those who enacted § 1983 was dissimilar
to contemporary thinking. 28 Moreover, there is little indication that the

legislators who crafted § 1983 were concerned with preserving historicallyrecognized immunities. Scholars who have studied the matter have
consistently concluded that the statute's legislative history, consistent with its
text, reflects a predominant congressional concern with crafting a remedy
more efficacious than the common law, which had not proven effective to
protect constitutional rights. 29 The Supreme Court has, moreover,
acknowledged:

"Section

1983

'ha[s]

no precise

counterpart

in state

law . . [It is the purest coincidence when state statutes or the common law
provide for equivalent remedies; any analogies to those causes of action are
bound to be imperfect."'30 Thus, it is far from clear that common law defenses
unsupported by § 1983's text are properly read into a statute not crafted to
track the common law.
28.

See, e.g., Richard A. Matasar, PersonalImmunities Under Section 1983: The Limits

of the Court'sHistoricalAnalysis,40 ARK. L. REV. 741, 766 (1987) ("The legislative history of
important Reconstruction Era statutes shows a number of legislators who were quite aware of
interpretational methodology .... Some tied interpretation of provisions solely to their plain
meaning. Others began with plain meaning, but accepted evidence of legislative intent as a
method for resolving ambiguities in language. Others suggested that regardless of plain meaning
or legislative statements, the legislation should be interpreted broadly because of its overall
remedial purposes. Although there were not a great number of speakers who directly addressed
proper interpretational methodology, there is absolutely no suggestion by anyone that
congressional silence should be read to override either plain meaning or actual legislative
statements." (footnotes omitted)).
29. See, e.g., David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 US.C. § 1983: Interpretive
Approach and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497, 523-24 (1992) ("The
42nd Congress was well aware that it was creating a new cause of action that protected
constitutional rights by restricting the previously existing powers and privileges of state and
local officials . . .. Immunities designed to minimize the extent to which common-law principles
unintentionally impinged on official prerogatives would be peculiarly ill-suited to a statute
which was primarily intended to prevent the abuse of those prerogatives."); Matasar, supra note
28, at 774-75 ("Although section 1983 was not the subject of much discussion or objection, its
drafters and supporters clearly stated its broad remedial purpose. Moreover, at least some of the
supporters of section 1983 believed that the only effective means to enforce federal rights would
be by suits against state officers. A Congress concerned with effective legislation that intended
to limit that legislation's scope would be unlikely to do so silently." (footnotes omitted));
Michael Wells, ConstitutionalRemedies, Section 1983, and the Common Law, 68 MIss. L.J.

157, 177-78 (1998) ("The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 contains many
indications that Congress intended to enact a sweeping remedy in order to deal with the serious
problem that prompted the statute. That problem was Ku Klux Klan violence against the newlyfreed blacks and their white supporters in the South . . [F]ar from adopting the common law,
Congress may have meant to ignore it in the event it got in the way of the statute's remedial aim.
Common law limitations on recovery, such as the immunity doctrines, may actually be at odds
with Congress' intent." (footnotes omitted)).
30. Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 366 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985)).
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Even if a deeply entrenched common law immunity rule could be read
into § 1983, the historical record stops well short of reflecting anything like
the defense of qualified immunity that the Supreme Court has recognized.
Consider, for example, Piersonv. Ray, in which the Court first endeavored to

place a historical gloss on § 1983, writing that the statute "should be read
against the background of tort liability .. . Part of the background of tort
liability, in the case of police officers making an arrest, is the defense of good
faith and probable cause." 3 1 The Court, however, subsequently broadened this
defense into a general doctrine of immunity for actions based on a good faith
and reasonable belief that they comport with the law without claiming that the
common law had ever recognized this type of defense outside of the context
of false arrest.3 2 Thus, as a number of scholars have concluded, history does
not support the view that § 1983 was enacted against the backdrop of a general
defense of qualified immunity. 33

In any event, the Court abandoned the view that qualified immunity rests
on historical standards in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.34 In that case, the Court

concluded that "bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject
government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad31. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)).
32. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) ("[A] school board member
is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student."); Scheuerv. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) ("[A] qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive
branch of government .... It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the
time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for
qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.").
33. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 502-06 (2009) (arguing that Pierson misapprehended immunity law
existing when § 1983 was enacted); Baude, supra note 11, at 55-61 (discussing conflicting
historical evidence casting doubt on the existence of a widely accepted immunity rule at the time
of § 1983's enactment); Ann Woolhandler, Patternsof Official Immunity andAccountability, 37
CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 396, 432-70 (1986) (arguing that Pierson and subsequent immunity
doctrine depart from nineteenth-century approaches to immunity). But cf Scott A. Keller,
Qualified and Absolute Immunity at Common Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 6), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3680714 [https://perma.
cc/27JA-226A] ("[T]he Supreme Court's current officer immunity doctrines depart from the
common law around 1871 in three main ways: (1) high-ranking executive officers had absolute
immunity at common law, while today they have only qualified immunity (and vice versa for
government prosecutors and legislative aides); (2) qualified immunity at common law could be
overridden by showing an officer's subjective improper motive, while today the clearlyestablished-law test applies; and (3) qualified immunity at common law required the plaintiff to
prove bad faith with clear evidence, while there is confusion today over whether the plaintiff or
defendant has the burden of proof in qualified immunity cases.").
34. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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discovery."35

Instead,

"government

officials

performing

discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 36
Therefore, as the Court subsequently acknowledged, Harlow "completely
reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the
common law, replacing the inquiry into subjective malice so frequently
required at common law with an objective inquiry into the legal
reasonableness of the official action." 37
Accordingly, as currently formulated, qualified immunity is not anchored
in any background legal principle extant at the time § 1983 was enacted.
Indeed, in recent years, a number of the Court's members have complained
that qualified immunity jurisprudence has departed from historical
standards. 38 Given the disjunction between historical standards and
contemporary doctrine, it is surely untenable to defend current qualified
immunity doctrine on the ground that

§ 1983 implicitly imported the

prevailing immunity defense when it was enacted. 39
35. Id. at 817-18.
36. Id. at 818 (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987).
38. See, e.g., Ziglarv. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) ("In further elaborating the doctrine of qualified immunity for
executive officials, . . .we have diverged from the historical inquiry mandated by the statute.");
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur treatment of
qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has not purported to be faithful to the common-law
immunities that existed when § 1983 was enacted, and that the statute presumably intended to
subsume."); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 170 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In the context
of qualified immunity for public officials, . . . we have diverged to a substantial degree from the
historical standards.").
39. On at least one occasion, the Court has offered a different legal justification for
qualified immunity rooted in conceptions of fair notice. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739
(2002) ("Officers sued in a civil action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have the same right
to fair notice as do defendants charged with the criminal offense defined in 18 U.S.C. § 242.").
There is, however, an important textual difference between § 1983 and the criminal provision
referenced by the Court. Section 242 imposes criminal liability on "[w]hoever, under color of
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person . .. to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or
laws of the United States," 18 U. S.C. § 242 (emphasis added), whereas § 1983 has no willfulness
requirement. This textual difference undermines the view that the same standard for notice is
imposed by both statutes, as Professor Baude has observed. See Baude, supra note 11, at 73-74.
Indeed, while the criminal statute's willfulness requirement suggests that defendants cannot be
held liable unless they knew that their conduct infringed constitutional rights, there is no such
requirement in § 1983. Nor is there any rule requiring immunity from liability when the
defendant merely fails to anticipate a new rule of constitutional law; for example, despite
concerns about fair notice, the Court has insisted that new rules of constitutional law should be
retroactively applied to all pending and future cases even in cases arising from events predating
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Stare Decisis

In light of the weakness of a historically-based defense of qualified
immunity, the few scholars willing to defend the doctrine have offered some
alternative justifications. For example, Aaron Nielson and Christopher
Walker have argued that "when it comes to nonconstitutional holdings, 'stare
decisis carries enhanced force," and for that reason, "if the United States as a
society does not want qualified immunity, Congress should enact new
legislation." On this view, qualified immunity doctrine may be a mistake,
but it is one that only Congress can correct.
the announcement of the new rule. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep't of Tax'n, 509 U.S. 86, 97
(1993) ("When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the
controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still
open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate
our announcement of the rule."). Moreover, in terms of constitutional concerns about fair notice,
the Supreme Court has long taken the view that "the relative importance of fair notice and fair
enforcement-depends in part on the nature of the enactments" and "[t]he Court
has . . expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties
because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe." Vill. of Hoffman Ests.
v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982). Even in the criminal context,
concern for fair notice has not generated a general defense of qualified immunity, but instead a
due process defense available when a "court's decision was 'unexpected and indefensible' such
that it offended the due process principle of fair warning...." Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S.
451, 466 (2001) (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964)). Qualified
immunity doctrine, of course, provides far greater protection granting immunity as long as
there is no violation of clearly established law. Finally, when it comes to concerns about fair
notice, § 1983 jurisprudence is inconsistent; the Court has refused to recognize a defense of
qualified immunity for municipal defendants facing even unforeseeable liabilities. See, e.g.,
Owen v. City of Indep., 445 U.S. 622, 655 (1980) ("[E]ven where some constitutional
development could not have been foreseen by municipal officials, it is fairer to allocate any
resulting financial loss to the inevitable costs of government borne by all the taxpayers, than to
allow its impact to be felt solely by those whose rights, albeit newly recognized, have been
violated.").
40. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified
Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1856 (2018). Nielson and Walker have endeavored
to bolster their argument for the precedential force of current qualified immunity doctrine by
contending that "a judicial decision invaliding qualified immunity would be extraordinarily
disruptive to reliance interests" because "against a backdrop of decades of consistent cases from
the U.S. Supreme Court [recognizing qualified immunity], state governments have created their
own schemes for compensating officers, and . . . a key part of virtually all those schemes is
indemnification." Nielson & Walker, supra note 15, at 66-67 (footnote omitted). Yet, in their
own survey of state indemnification laws, they identify none that distinguish between liability
for damages under § 1983 and liabilities imposed under other federal or state laws under which
the defense of qualified immunity is not recognized. Id. at 40, 45-46, 50 (surveying state
indemnification laws and identifying none that indemnify only for damages awarded under
§ 1983 and not for other types of legal costs for which qualified immunity is unavailable). They
also acknowledge that "[s]ome States have . . . essentially eliminate[d] qualified immunity for

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 9
558

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 72: 5471

It is rather odd to defend qualified immunity doctrine based on the force
of stare decisis when Harlow itself repudiated prior precedent and
reformulated qualified immunity without precedential support. 41 To be sure,
Harlow was itself a Bivens case not subject to § 1983,42 but the Court applied
its new rule to § 1983 litigation as well, even though Congress had not revised
the statute. 43 Similarly, the Court promulgated and later retracted a rule
requiring lower courts to decide in both § 1983 and Bivens litigation whether
the plaintiff has established a violation of the Constitution before reaching a
proffered qualified immunity defense. 44 And the Court's willingness to revise
§ 1983 precedent is not confined to qualified immunity. For example, the
Court also repudiated its prior interpretation that the statute did not permit
municipal liability despite the force of stare decisis. 45 Thus, there is more than
a little force to Scott Michelman's conclusion: "The Court's history of taking
certain claims by creating overlapping state causes of action that are not subject to such a
defense." Id. at 68; see also Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity and FederalismAll the
Way Down, 109 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 23), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=3565362 [https://perma.cc/Q6WL-DQ26] ("[S]tates' indemnification
statutes concern liability for both Section 1983 claims and state tort claims including assault,
battery, negligence, and the like where qualified immunity cannot shield government officials
from liability. If states enacted their indemnification statutes in reliance on qualified immunity
doctrine, they presumably would have focused indemnification to Section 1983 claims, where
qualified immunity could provide the protection Nielson and Walker describe."). Accordingly,
since indemnification is available on equal terms for § 1983 and other types of claims even
state law claims on which there is no qualified immunity the claim that state and local
indemnification practices are premised upon the federal law of qualified immunity seems
dubious. Indeed, as we will see, there are powerful reasons for employers to offer employees
indemnification regardless of the availability of qualified immunity. See infra text
accompanying notes 114-115. In any event, Professors Nielson and Walker do not explain why
revising state indemnification laws in the wake of the abolition of qualified immunity would
pose special difficulties so serious as to warrant granting qualified immunity extraordinary
precedential weight.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
42. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 802-06 (1982).
43. Id. at 818 n.30 ("This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity
available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have
found previously, however, that it would be 'untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of
immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought
directly under the Constitution against federal officials."' (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 504 (1978))). Although this statement was technically dicta in Harlow, the Court soon
squarely held the Harlow reformulation of qualified immunity was applicable to § 1983
litigation. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1984) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
44. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-43 (2009) (first citing Harlow, 457 U.S.
at 818; then citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987); then citing Saucierv.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); then citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841
n.5 (1998); and then citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1991)) (explaining the
evolution of § 1983 jurisprudence on this point).
45. See Monelly. Dep't of Soc. Servs. ofN.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 695-701 (1978) (explaining
the evolution of § 1983 jurisprudence on this point).
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ownership of this doctrine, together with the constitutional implications of the
doctrine itself, should overcome the force of the special 'statutory stare
decisis' rule." 46
3.

Common Law Statute

Perhaps the best defense of qualified immunity in the scholarly literature
is that § 1983 should be regarded as a kind of "common law statute" that
effectively delegates authority to the judiciary to promulgate doctrine, much
like the Sherman Act gave birth to a complex law of antitrust hardly evident
from the terms of that statute. 47

By its own account, the Supreme Court "has treated the Sherman Act as
a common-law statute . . Just as the common law adapts to modern
understanding and greater experience, so too does the Sherman Act's
prohibition on 'restraint[s] of trade' evolve to meet the dynamics of present
economic conditions." 48 Notably, the Sherman Act is crafted at a high level
of generality, prohibiting "every contract, combination .. . or conspiracy in

restraint of trade." 49 Since almost any economic arrangement involving
competitors could be regarded as a "restraint of trade," the statute effectively

46. Scott Michelman, The Branch Best Qualiedto Abolish Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1999, 2007 (2018). Relatedly, Justice Scalia once defended qualified immunity on the
ground that the Court erred in holding that § 1983 reached those who abused their authority
under state law in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191-92 (1961), overruled in partby Monell,
436 U.S. at 659, 663 n.7, thereby "chang[ing] a statute that had generated only twenty-one cases
in the first fifty years of its existence into one that pours into the federal courts tens of thousands
of suits each year," and consequently, in Justice Scalia's view, the Court was "engaged,
therefore, in the essentially legislative activity of crafting a sensible scheme of qualified
immunities for the statute we have invented rather than applying the common law embodied
in the statute that Congress wrote." Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U. S. 574,611-12 (1998) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). As Professor Baude observed, however, this defense of qualified immunity is
dubious, both because there are strong arguments in favor of Monroe and because qualified
immunity doctrine is not tailored to remedy Monroe's supposedly erroneous holding that § 1983
supplies a remedy in cases even in which state law provides plaintiffs with adequate remedies.
See Baude, supra note 11, at 62-67.
47. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 15, at 991-94 (characterizing § 1983 as a common law
statute); Hillel Y. Levin & Michael L. Wells, Qualfed Immunity and Statutory Interpretation:
A Response to William Baude, 9 CALIF. L. REV. ONLiNE 40, 51-53 (2018) (same); Michelman,
supra note 46, at 2002-06; see also Baude, supra note 11, at 78 ("Maybe Section 1983 could be
reconceived as a common-law statute analogous to the Sherman Antitrust Act.").
48. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007)
(alteration in original). To a similar effect, see, for example, Nat'l Soc'y of Prof l Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) ("Congress . . did not intend the text of the Sherman
Act to delineate the full meaning of the statute or its application in concrete situations. The
legislative history makes it perfectly clear that it expected the courts to give shape to the statute's
broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.").
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
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forced courts to develop judicially-administrable rules without much in the
way of statutory guidance, as scholars have long observed.50
Section 1983, in contrast, offers far less textual room for treatment as a
common law statute. In unambiguous terms,

§ 1983 provides that "[e]very

person" acting under color of state law who "subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any . . person . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured ... .. " Once a court finds that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of
a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, it is hard to see any textual room for creating a common law
defense to liability, such as the qualified immunity defense.
B.

The Statutory Basisfor a Common Law of QualifiedImmunity

A more promising basis for qualified immunity doctrine is hiding in plain

sight. In the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress not only prohibited racial
discrimination with respect to enumerated rights,5 2 but also, in § 3, conferred
authority on the courts to utilize common law or state law rules when federal
statutes "are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies .

. .

."3 As subsequently amended, this

50. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST 34 (2017) ("[T]he
Sherman Act condemns 'every contract, combination . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade,'
without giving a clue about what those phrases mean."); William F. Baxter, Separation of
Powers, ProsecutorialDiscretion, and the "Common Law "Nature ofAntitrust Law, 60 TEX. L.

REV. 661, 663 (1982) ("Congress adopted what is in essence enabling legislation that has
permitted a common-law refinement of antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the
most general statutory directions.").
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
52. In pertinent part, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided:
[Sec. 1] . . [A]ll persons born in the United States . . are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color . .. shall have
the same right . .. to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence,
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
53. Section 3 provided, in pertinent part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters hereby conferred on the district and
circuit courts of the United States shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with
the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into
effect; but in all cases where such laws are not adapted to the object, or are deficient
in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offences against
law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the
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provision, now codified in Title 42 of the United States Code at § 1988(a),
authorizes the courts to supplement various civil rights statutes, including
§ 1983:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district
courts by the provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised

Statutes for the protection of all persons in the United States in their
civil rights [which includes § 1983], and for their vindication, shall
be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the
United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into
effect; but in all cases where they are not adaptedto the object, or
are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies
and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the

court havingjurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so
far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States, shall be extended to and govern the saidcourts in
the disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the
infliction of punishment on the guilty party.5 4
Section 1988(a), accordingly, is a gap-filling provision that permits federal

courts to supplement § 1983's terms with state or common law doctrine.55
To be sure, the correct application of this provision is hardly selfevident. 56 Indeed, it has generated disagreement on the infrequent occasions
in which scholarly literature has addressed it. Jennifer Coleman, stressing
§ 1988(a)'s textual command to apply state law, concluded that it requires that
the law of the state in which the case is brought govern all questions not
addressed by § 1983 itself-including questions of immunity-unless
applicable state law is inconsistent with

§ 1983 jurisprudence.5 7 In contrast,

State wherein the court having jurisdiction of the cause, civil or criminal, is held, so
far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,
shall be extended to and govern said courts in the trial and disposition of such cause,
and, if of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
Id. at § 3, 14 Stat. at 27.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (emphasis added).
55. See, e.g., Moor v. Alameda Cnty., 411 U.S. 693, 705 (1973) (§ 1988(a) "explain[s]
the source of law to be applied in actions brought to enforce the substantive provisions of the
Act," including § 1983).
56. For a helpful overview of the difficulties in interpreting this statute, see Jack M.
Beermann, A CriticalApproach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42
STAN. L. REv. 51, 58-65 (1989).
57. See Jennifer A. Coleman, 42 US.C. Section 1988: A Congressionally-Mandated
Approach to the Construction of Section 1983, 19 IND. L. REv. 665, 722-32 (1986) (arguing
that immunity is not addressed in § 1983 and therefore is governed by § 1988(a)).
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Theodore Eisenberg concluded that § 1988 applies state law only to civil or
criminal litigation asserting a state claim when removed from state to federal
court under the terms of the 1866 Act; it does not apply to a claim based on
federal rights under

§ 1983.58 Seth Kreimer argued that § 1988(a)'s reference

to "the common law" requires application of federal common law rules to
matters not addressed by

§ 1983, although § 1988(a) does requires application

of state statutes and constitutional provisions. 59
Of these views, the least plausible is that of Professor Eisenberg. Even if,
as Professor Eisenberg argued, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, when originally

enacted, applied only to lawsuits based on state law that had been removed
from state to federal court under the terms of that Act, the Civil Rights Act of
1871 subsequently made the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866including

§ 3-applicable to all actions brought under what is now § 1983.60

Thus, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 rendered wholly untenable any effort to
confine what would become § 1988(a) to actions that are based in state law
and subsequently removed from state courts.61 For this reason, it is no surprise
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that § 1988(a) applies to actions
for deprivations of federal rights under

§ 1983.62

58. See Theodore Eisenberg, State Law in FederalCivilRights Cases: The ProperScope
of Section 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 525-41 (1980) (arguing that there is little indication
that Congress intended to apply state law to lawsuits asserting federal rights when it enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1871).
59. See Seth F. Kreimer, The Source ofLaw in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on
Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 601, 611-32 (1985) (arguing that when § 1983 was enacted,
references to the common law were generally understood to refer to a general federal common

law).
60. See An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, Sess. I, 17 Stat. 13 (1871)
("[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of
any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United
States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of
the United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action of law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several
district or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review
upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of [the
Civil Rights Act of 1866] .... ").
61. See Kreimer, supra note 59, at 621 n.94 ("Professor Eisenberg has argued at length
that § 1988 was designed to apply only to cases initially brought under state law, usually those
removed from state to federal court. As an interpretation of the 1866 predecessor, this position
is plausible, although it rests on the assumption that the second sentence of § 3 of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act refers to only half of the first sentence. As an interpretation of [§ 1988(a) as
subsequently amended], however, it is at war with the text, for [§ 1988] applies by its terms to a
variety of federal causes of action." (citations omitted)).
62. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-75 (1985) (relying on § 1988(a) to
hold that state statutes of limitations for actions concerning a personal injury should apply to
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§ 1988(a) applies

to civil actions brought under § 1983, it becomes impossible to claim that
§ 1983's text resolves all questions regarding the liability of those who, acting
under color of state law, deprive others of constitutional rights. If it did, there
would be no need for Congress, in 1871, to have made what is now

§ 1988(a)

applicable to § 1983 litigation when that statute is "not adapted to the object,
or . . deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies . .

."63

One might nonetheless attack the lawfulness of qualified immunity by
taking the view that § 1988(a)'s reference to cases in which § 1983 is "not
adapted to the object" or "deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish
suitable remedies" 64 is simply meant to aid plaintiffs by authorizing courts to
utilize remedies not expressly mentioned in

§ 1983's text. This view,

however, ignores the possibility that there may be cases in which no remedyor no damages remedy-is "suitable" within the meaning of § 1988(a).
This is indeed the path the Supreme Court has taken. The Court has held,
for example, that § 1983 is "not adapted to the object" or "deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies" when it is entirely silent on
a type of defense usually recognized in civil litigation. The Court has therefore
held that, under § 1988(a), state law should determine whether a § 1983 claim
survives the death of the plaintiff because § 1983 is silent on questions of
survival. 65 The Court has also held that, by virtue of § 1988(a), federal courts

should utilize state statutes of limitation in § 1983 litigation since it contains
no such provision. 66 Thus, § 1988(a) can be used not only to avail plaintiffs
of remedies not referenced in § 1983 but also to recognize defenses that bar
any remedy.

One might also argue that § 1988(a) is triggered only with respect to
complete defenses to liability on which § 1983 is entirely silent, such as
survival or limitations defenses, but has no application to defenses, such as
qualified immunity, which involve only the suitability of a particular remedy,
such as an award of damages. Section 1988(a), however, states that it is
applicable when § 1983 is regarded as "deficient in the provisions necessary
to furnish suitable remedies .... "67 This means that § 1988(a) should be
§ 1983 claims); Robertsonv. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588-94 (1978) (relying on § 1988(a) to
hold that state law governs survival of claims brought under § 1983).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).
64. Id.
65. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 593-94 (applying Louisiana's statute governing survival
of actions to § 1983 claims by virtue of § 1988(a) and holding that plaintiff's action did not
survive the injured party's death).
66. See Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 48-50 (1984) (holding that § 1988(a) requires
the use of state limitations periods in § 1983 litigation).
67. § 1988(a).
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applied when considering both whether a complete defense bars any remedy
and whether damages, in particular, are a "suitable" remedy. 68
On the question of whether damages are a "suitable" remedy for a
particular § 1983 violation, the statute itself is silent. It provides only that
those who, under color of state law, deprive an individual of a constitutional
right "shall be liable to the party injured ... ."69 Moreover, § 1983 addresses
liability, as opposed to damages or other remedies, and it does not provide that
damages must be awarded in all § 1983 cases. Indeed, in one of its early
encounters with § 1988(a), the Court explained that when issues arise about
whether damages are available under the civil rights statutes covered by
§ 1988(a), that provision governs, under which "both federal and state rules
on damages may be utilized, whichever better serves the policies expressed in
the federal statutes." 7 0
Qualified immunity, moreover, is not a defense to or immunity from

liability but is instead an immunity from a particular remedy-damages.71
Qualified immunity, for example, does not bar actions for injunctive relief.72
It may even permit actions for nominal damages; the Supreme Court has never
decided the question, and there is a serious argument that actions for nominal
damages do not present the chilling effects of exposure to substantial damages
68. Cf Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702-03 (1973) ("[Section] 1988
proceeds to authorize federal courts, where federal law is unsuited or insufficient 'to furnish
suitable remedies,' to look to principles of the common law, as altered by state law, so long as
such principles are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.").
69. § 1983.
70. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 231, 235, 240 (1969) (discussing
the availability of damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 for racial discrimination in public
accommodations).
71. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314 n.6 (1975) ("[I]mmunity from
damages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief as well.").
72. See, e.g., Pearsonv. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009) ("Most of the constitutional
issues that are presented in § 1983 damages actions and Bivens cases also arise in cases in which
that defense is not available, such as . .. § 1983 cases against individuals where injunctive relief
is sought instead of or in addition to damages."); Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
841 n.5 (1998) ("[I]n a suit to enjoin future conduct . . qualified immunity [would not] be
available to block a determination of law."); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312 (1996)
("The Harlow right to immunity is a right to immunityfrom certain claims, not from litigation
in general . . . . If the district court rules erroneously, the qualified-immunity right not to be
subjected to pretrial proceedings will be eliminated, so long as . . .the complaint seeks
injunctive relief (for which no 'clearly established' right need be alleged)."); Wood, 420 U.S. at
314 n.6 ("[I]mmunity from damages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief as well."). The Court
has also held that judicial immunity does not bar claims for injunctive relief under § 1983. See
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984). Congress subsequently modified this rule by
adding an exceptions clause to § 1983 in a manner that effectively acknowledged the absence of
judicial immunity from actions seeking injunctive relief: "[I]n an action against a judicial officer
for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 309, 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996).
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liability that the Court has relied upon when fashioning qualified immunity
doctrine. 73 Thus, § 1983's textual reference to liability does not address the
question whether damages represent a "suitable" remedy for a § 1983
violation. 74 In the face of that silence, § 1988(a) authorizes courts to fashion
a common law of remedies when considering whether damages are
appropriately awarded under

§ 1983.

Moreover, if one concluded that

§ 1983 should be read to mean that

damages are a suitable remedy in all cases-leaving no gap for § 1988(a) to
fill-more than just qualified immunity doctrine would be in jeopardy. For

example, the Supreme Court has recognized absolute immunity from damages
liability under § 1983 for legislators, 75 judges and other adjudicative officials
acting in a judicial capacity, 76 witnesses, 77 and prosecutors in their litigative
capacity. 78 If

§ 1983 were understood to require damages awards whenever a

defendant is held liable, all of these immunities would be indefensible. 79 Nor
is there much of a justification for reading, at a minimum, prosecutorial or
witness immunity into § 1983 as a kind of historical gloss on the statute.
Importing common law defenses into § 1983 as a historical gloss on the statute
is a fraught exercise, as we have seen, 80 but even if one could do so, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that absolute immunity was not recognized

73. See James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional
Tort Claimsfor Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1622-28 (2011); Michael L.
Wells, ConstitutionalRemedies: Reconciling Official Immunity with the Vindication ofRights,
88 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 713, 739-43 (2014).
74. Cf Achtenberg, supra note 29, at 516 ("Immunity doctrines define the permissible
remedies rather than the permissible defendants.").
75. See, e.g., Lake Cnty. Ests. v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 394, 403-06
(1979) (recognizing absolute immunity for members of interstate agency when acting in capacity
comparable to members of a legislature); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-79 (1951)
(holding that legislators acting within scope of their duties are immune from civil liability when
sued for allegedly improper investigation).
76. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-14 (1978) (recognizing immunity for
administrative agency adjudicators); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359-360 (1978)
(recognizing immunity of judge sued for issuing a sterilization order).
77. See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 369 (2012) (recognizing immunity of
witnesses before a grand jury); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983) (recognizing
immunity of witnesses at trial).
78. See, e.g., Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 346-49 (2009) (recognizing
immunity when supervisory prosecutors sued for inadequate training and supervision of
litigation); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (recognizing immunity for
prosecutor's actions in bringing and presenting case).
79. These immunities, moreover, are, like qualified immunity, only immunities from
damages liability and not complete defenses to liability. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S.
522, 541-42 (1984) (concluding that judicial immunity does not bar actions for injunctive relief).
80. See supra Section II.A.1
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or witnesses. 82 It is

therefore quite difficult to read these immunities into the statute on the basis
of their supposed historical footing.
Thus, although the Court has rarely discussed § 1988(a) in its immunity
jurisprudence, the best way to reconcile that jurisprudence with the terms of
§ 1983 is to conclude that the question of whether damages are a "suitable"
remedy for a violation of § 1983 is not addressed by that statute. Instead, it is
appropriately addressed under § 1988(a), which authorizes the courts to
develop immunity doctrines when assessing whether damages are an
appropriate remedy for a

§ 1983 violation.

Even if § 1988(a) authorizes courts to develop a law of immunity to assess
whether damages are a "suitable" remedy, the statutory inquiry is not at an
end. As the Supreme Court has observed, the text of § 1988(a) suggests a
three-step process:

First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States "so far as
such laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights
statutes] into effect." If no suitable federal rule exists, courts
undertake the second step by considering application of state
"common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes" of the forum State. A third step asserts the predominance of
the federal interest: courts are to apply state law only if it is not
"inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 83
Accordingly, if § 1983's failure to address whether and when damages
constitute "suitable remedies" renders the statute "deficient" within the
meaning of

§ 1988(a), § 1988(a)'s second step directs courts to apply "the

81. See, e.g., Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 364 ("When § 1983's predecessor was enacted in
1871, it was common for criminal cases to be prosecuted by private parties. And private
prosecutors, like private plaintiffs in civil suits, did not enjoy absolute immunity from suit.
Instead, 'the generally accepted rule' was that a private complainant who procured an arrest or
prosecution could be held liable in an action for malicious prosecution if the complainant acted
with malice and without probable cause." (citations omitted)). On the prevalence of private
prosecution in the nineteenth century, see Abraham S. Goldstein, Prosecution:History of the
Public Prosecutor,in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1286 (Sanford M. Kadish et al.

eds., 1983).
82. See, e.g., Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 366-67 ("At common law, trial witnesses enjoyed a
limited form of absolute immunity for statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding:
They had complete immunity against slander and libel claims, even if it was alleged that the
statements in question were maliciously false." (citing Kalina v. Fletcher 522 U.S. 118, 133
(1997) (Scalia, J. concurring)). For a helpful discussion of the history of witness immunity, see
Van Vechten Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation:Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L.
REV. 463 (1909).
83. Bumettv. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1984) (citations omitted).
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common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the
State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is
held," followed by its third step, inquiring whether "the same is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States .... "84 It is
to these inquiries that we now turn.
C.

The Justificationfor a Federal Common Law of QualifiedImmunity

When it comes to the second step of the § 1988(a) inquiry, Professors
Coleman and Kreimer have argued that § 1988(a) generally requires that
federal courts apply state immunity statutes to § 1983 litigation unless state
law is inconsistent with applicable federal law and policy.8 5 There are plenty
of state immunity statutes to go around-forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia recognize a wide variety of common law and statutory immunities
from damages liability, such as immunity for discretionary functions; for
injuries caused by reliance on statutes or other enactments; for injuries caused
by the collection of a tax; for intentional torts; for the issuance, denial, or
revocation of a license; for the failure to inspect or to make an adequate
inspection of property; for the adoption or failure to adopt legislation or other
legislative functions; or for acts or omissions in the execution or enforcement
of the law, and most states also cap the damages recoverable from a
governmental defendant or a public employee. 86
Application of state law immunities, however, encounters a serious
question under the third step-whether the use of state immunity statutes
would be consistent with federal law. At the outset, there is a serious question
about whether federal law requires a greater degree of uniformity in § 1983
jurisprudence than could be achieved by importing the bewildering variety of
state immunity statutes. When deciding whether to borrow state law under
§ 1988(a), the Supreme Court has cautioned that "courts must look not only
at particular federal statutes and constitutional provisions[] but also at 'the
policies expressed in [them]."'87 Moreover, the Court has recognized a federal

84. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).
85. See Coleman, supra note 57, at 731 (arguing that state law applies unless "the use of
state law would substantially undermine the fundamental purposes of section 1983"); Kreimer,
supra note 59, at 632 ("[W]hatever alterations state statutes make in the underlying federal rule
must still be measured against the policies of federal legislation . . .. Application of state law
must be contingent on the full availability of the federal remedy.").
86. See Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts,
ConstitutionalTorts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 804-13 (2007).
87. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (second alteration in original)
(quoting Sullivanv. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969)).
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policy to maintain a reasonably uniform body of § 1983 jurisprudence. 88 Since

§ 1988(a)'s third step requires a reasonable degree of uniformity in § 1983
jurisprudence, there is great doubt about whether federal law permits the use
of a bewildering variety of state immunity rules. 89
Beyond the federal interest in uniformity, however, the Supreme Court
has consistently cautioned-in terms that echo § 1988(a)'s third step-that
the use of state immunity law is inconsistent with federal law and policy in
that it makes the availability of damages turn on state, rather than federal,
policy judgments.
For example, in Martinez v. California,90 a

§ 1983 action arising from a

murder committed by a state parolee, the Court wrote that a state statute
immunizing public officials from liability for injuries caused by paroling a
prisoner "does not control this claim.. .. "91 The Court reasoned: "A
construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense
to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory
promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper
construction may be enforced." 92
Subsequently, in Felder v. Casey,93 the Supreme Court cautioned:

Any assessment of the applicability of a state law to federal civil
rights litigation[] . .. must be made in light of the purpose and nature
of the federal right. This is so whether the question of state-law
applicability arises in § 1983 litigation brought in state courts, which
possess concurrent jurisdiction over such actions, or in federal-court
litigation, where, because the federal civil rights laws fail to provide
certain rules of decision thought essential to the orderly adjudication
of rights, courts are occasionally called upon to borrow state law.
Accordingly, we have held that a state law that immunizes
government conduct otherwise

subject to suit under

§ 1983 is

preempted, even where the federal civil rights litigation takes place
88. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 270 (1985) ("[T]he federal interest
in uniformity and the interest in having 'firmly defined, easily applied rules,' support the
conclusion that Congress intended the characterization of § 1983 to be measured by federal
rather than state standards." (citation omitted)).
89. Cf id at 275-76 (deciding that when borrowing state statutes of limitations, federal
law requires that all § 1983 claims be characterized as actions to recover for a personal injury to
produce a uniform federal rule).
90. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
91. Id. at 284.
92. Id. at 284 n.8. Later the same Term, in the course of holding that municipalities do
not enjoy qualified immunity from damages liability under § 1983, the Court wrote: "Municipal
defenses including an assertion of sovereign immunity to a federal right of action are, of
course, governed by federal law." Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 647 n.30 (1980).
93. 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
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in state court, because the application of the state immunity law
would thwart the congressional remedy, which of course already
provides certain immunities for state officials. 94
The Court then held that Wisconsin's requirement that a plaintiff file an
administrative claim prior to filing suit could not be applied to § 1983
litigation because "it conditions the right of recovery that Congress has
authorized, and does so for a reason manifestly inconsistent with the purposes
of the federal statute: to minimize governmental liability." 95
Two years later, in Howlett v. Rose, 96 the Court held that state courts
could not apply state sovereign immunity law barring suits

against

municipalities to a § 1983 action: "To the extent that the Florida law of
sovereign immunity reflects a substantive disagreement with the extent to
which governmental entities should be held liable for their constitutional
violations, that disagreement cannot override the dictates of federal law." 97
Finally, in Haywood v. Drown,98 the Court held that a New York statute

requiring that lawsuits against prison guards be filed in the state's court of
claims-which may not award punitive damages, injunctive relief, or
attorney's fees-could not be applied to § 1983 litigation because it is "a law
designed to shield a particular class of defendants (correction officers) from a
particular type of liability (damages) brought by a particular class of plaintiffs
(prisoners)," adding that the state statute "is effectively an immunity statute
cloaked in jurisdictional garb." 99
These cases are not deeply theorized, and only Felderexpressly mentions
§ 1988(a). 100 Nevertheless, § 1988, and in particular, the third step of the
inquiry mandated by § 1988(a), offers what is likely the best explanation for
the Court's jurisprudence. 101 After all, these cases reflect a federal common
law judgment about the propriety of damages remedies and, in particular,
holdings that the availability of damages remedies should be controlled by
federal and not state law.
Moreover, under the third step of the § 1988(a) inquiry-which requires
that state law not be applied to § 1983 litigation when it unduly circumscribes
94. Id. at 139 (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 134, 141.
96. 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
97. Id. at 365-66, 377-78.
98. 556 U.S. 729 (2009).
99. Id. at 742.
100. See Felder, 487 U.S. at 139 (citing and discussing § 1988).
101. See William H. Theis, Case Commentary, Shaw v. Garrison- Some Observationson
42 U.S. C. § 1983 and FederalCommon Law, 36 LA. L. REV. 681, 685-86 (1976) (noting that
qualified immunity doctrine seems to reflect federal common law under § 1988(a) although
courts rarely rely on that provision); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 48 (1984) (detailing the
third step).
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federal rights-it becomes difficult to leave the matter to state law. State
immunity statutes are enacted by state legislators who are politically
accountable to the state taxpayers and voters. They are hardly impartial
balancers of federal and state interests. It would surely be odd to leave the job
of striking the balance between the interests of state and local taxpayers and
the interests of those who have been harmed by a violation of federal law to
state legislators.
The Supreme Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence, accordingly, fits
far more comfortably within § 1988(a)'s delegation to the courts of authority
to create a federal common law than within any of the conventional
justifications that have been offered for qualified immunity. To be sure, the
current formulation of qualified immunity dates to Harlow, which does not

discuss § 1988(a), but that should be unsurprising. Harlow was brought under
Bivens, to which § 1988(a) is not applicable. As an example of federal
common law, however, Harlow's formulation of qualified immunity fits

comfortably within § 1988(a), which, as we have seen, permits federal courts
to utilize common law rules of decision. As Professor Kreimer observed:
"Note that section 1988[(a)] does not say 'the common law of the state' in
question but 'the common law."'102 Thus, under § 1988(a), the Court properly
imported the common law judgment it made in Harlow into

jurisprudence. 103
Accordingly,

§ 1983 immunity

§ 1988(a) authorizes the courts to utilize a federal common

law of immunity. Section 1988(a) permits courts to supplement

§ 1983 with

"the common law," 104 and at the time § 1988(a) was enacted, references to the
"common law" were generally understood to refer to the type of federal
common law that the federal courts employed when hearing cases between
citizens of different states under their diversity jurisdiction over lawsuits
between citizens of different states. 105 Thus, the Congress that enacted the
original formulation of § 1988(a) in 1866,106 as well as the Congress that made

102. Kreimer, supra note 59, at 619.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).
105. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 59, at 618-19 (discussing the use of federal common
law in diversity cases under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), prior to its
repudiation in ErieR.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and arguing that § 1988(a) is best
read to incorporate this regime); Theis, supra note 101, at 684 ("[T]he statute [§ 1988(a)] seems
to state the Swift v. Tyson rule: if no federal law (statute) governed, general common law applied
unless a state constitutional or statutory provision conflicted with or modified the general
common law. The requirement that state provisions not be inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States states the obvious; namely, the supremacy clause of the
Constitution would continue to play its role in the law selection process." (footnotes omitted)).
106. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
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it applicable to § 1983 actions in 1871,107 would have been well familiar with
federal common law.
In short, § 1988(a) offers both a lawful basis and what is likely the best
explanation for the course of the Supreme Court's immunity jurisprudence
under § 1983. One can disagree with the common law judgment reflected in
that jurisprudence, but once it is agreed that § 1983 is silent on questions of
whether damages constitute a "suitable" remedy, § 1988(a) governs that
question and authorizes the courts to make common law judgments about the
availability of damages, including the decision that damages awards should
sometimes be barred by a defense of qualified immunity.
III. THE FUNCTIONAL CASE FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Even if

§ 1988(a) supplies a lawful basis for a federal common law of

immunity under

§ 1983, it does necessarily follow that existing immunity

doctrine represents a sound common law judgment. This Part addresses that
issue.
A.

Is There Adequate Justificationfor Qua/fiedImmunity?

As we have seen, the Supreme Court has justified qualified immunity on
the theory that public officials will be inhibited in the performance of their
duties if they face damages liability whenever they violate the plaintiff's
rights.108 At first blush, there seems to be a substantial basis to fear overdeterrence if public officials faced unlimited liability.
Police officers' compensation is generally not based on their arrests or the
local crime rate; accordingly, officers internalize few, if any, of the benefits

107. See An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
108. See supra text accompanying note 10. John Jeffries has offered a different
justification, arguing that qualified immunity limits the costs associated with the recognition of
new constitutional rights by shielding officials from liability when new rights are recognized for
their prior conduct. See John C. Jeffries Jr., The Liability Rule for ConstitutionalTorts, 99 VA.
L. REV. 207, 247 (2013) ("Limitations on money damages facilitate constitutional evolution and
growth by reducing the cost of innovation. Judges contemplating an affirmation of constitutional
rights need not worry about the financial fallout."). This view, however, fails to account for the
fact that municipalities and other units of local government are not entitled to qualified
immunity, as Professor Jeffries acknowledges. See id at 232-33. Professor Jeffries does not
claim that this omission has inhibited constitutional innovation when it comes to claims against
units of local government, which would be precisely the type of evidence required to support his
hypothesis. See id.
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of effective policing, which are instead externalized to the public at large. 109
The same is likely true for most public officials. Thus, if officials are forced
to internalize the costs of their activities through damages liability, when they
do not internalize the benefits, the likely result would be to encourage officials
to avoid conduct that exposes them to liability, even if such conduct might
also produce benefits to the public at large." 0 On this view, Harlow and its
progeny sensibly offer immunity for officers who reasonably believe thattheir
conduct is consistent with extant law;I1 otherwise, there would be a risk of
over-deterrence. There are, however, powerful responses to this line of
reasoning.

1.

The Effects of-Indemnfication

The available empirical evidence suggests that the fears that damages
liability will over-deter public employees are greatly exaggerated in light of
the ubiquity of indemnification. Joanna Schwartz, for example, found: "In
109. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, The "New" Exclusionary Rule Debate: From "Still
Preoccupiedwith 1985" to "Virtual Deterrence," 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 743, 763-64 (2010)
("Individual officers do not internalize either the benefits or the costs of Fourth Amendment
activity. When the police apprehend an offender, they may improve their performance
evaluations and gain prestige within the force. They do not, however, pocket what the
community is willing to pay to prosecute and punish the offender."); Richard A. Posner,
Excessive Sanctions for GovernmentalMisconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635,
640 (1982) ("Police and other law-enforcement personnel are compensated on a salaried rather
than piece-rate basis, so that even if they perform their duties with extraordinary zeal and
effectiveness they do not receive financial rewards commensurate with their performance.").
110. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries Jr., DisaggregatingConstitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J.
259, 267 (2000) ("While negative outcomes can readily be translated into adverse legal claims,
the benefits of good performance are hard to capture. These skewed incentives may bias
discretionary choices .... The result is a bias toward inaction, defensiveness, and bureaucratic
self-protection."); cf Myron W. Orfield Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An
Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1017, 1053 (1987)
(detailing a survey of Chicago narcotics officers in which 95% believed that in response to a
regime of damages liability replacing the exclusionary rule for search-and-seizure in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, "police would be afraid to conduct the searches they should make").
For reviews of empirical evidence suggesting that police officers are sometimes subject to overdeterrence, see, for example, Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, What Causedthe 2016 Chicago
Homicide Spike? An EmpiricalExamination of the "ACLU Effect" and the Role of Stop and
Frisks in Preventing Gun Violence, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1581, 1585, 1649 (explaining that
burdens imposed by consent decree reduced rates of stop-and-frisk in Chicago and produced
increased homicide); Lawrence Rosenthal, Good and Bad Ways to Address Police Violence, 48
URB. LAW. 675, 717 (2016) (discussing evidence of reduced policing and increased crime
following events that led police to believe they are likely to be more closely scrutinized);
Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 754, 765-66
(2017) (discussing evidence that federal consent decrees inhibit policing and produce increased
crime).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
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stark contrast to assumptions underlying civil rights doctrine, law
enforcement officers employed by the eighty-one jurisdictions in my study
almost never contributed to settlements and judgments in police misconduct
lawsuits during the study period."11 2 This finding is consistent with the view
of most scholars who have written on the prevalence of public-sector
indemnification.11 3
Basic economic theory explains the ubiquity of indemnification.
Indemnification is the most efficient vehicle available for employers to
minimize the risk that their employees' exposure to liability will reduce
productivity and inhibit the willingness of highly-qualified individuals to take
these positions. 114 Qualified immunity, moreover, is not sufficient to solve the
problem because it does not insulate public employees from all costs of
litigation; for example, qualified immunity does not protect public employees
from the costs of retaining counsel and defending litigation brought against
them, even when litigation is likely to encounter a successful qualified
immunity defense. If public employees were not indemnified for their legal
costs, that alone could produce a substantial chilling effect on their
willingness to undertake activities that might expose them to liability.11 5
Given the prevalence of indemnification, public employees generally do
not experience financial consequences as a result of litigation arising from
their activities. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has refused to consider the
effects of indemnification in its qualified immunity jurisprudence, taking the
view that "[w]hatever contractual obligations [the public employer] may (or

112. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 912 (2014).
She added: "Although civil rights doctrine and most scholarship considering the question
assume that individual officers are personally responsible for punitive damages, no officer in
my study actually satisfied a punitive damages award entered against him." Id. at 917.
113. See, e.g., Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why CivilRights Lawsuits Do Not
Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution, 28

&

FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587, 590 (2000); Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 812, 819-20; Nielson
Walker, supra note 15, at 36-37; Martin A. Schwartz, Should Juries Be Informed that
Municipality Will Indemnify Officer's § 1983 Liability for Constitutional Wrongdoing?, 86

IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1217-20 (2001).
114. For a helpful explication of the economics of employee indemnification, see Larry B.
Kramer & Alan O. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis,
1987 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 272-76, 279.
115. To be sure, despite the availability of indemnification, public officials might be
deterred by the threat of liability if they somehow overestimated the risk that they would be
denied indemnification, although this possibility seems more theoretical than real. As Professor
Schwartz observed, "[s]tudies have found that 'the prospect of civil liability has a deterrent effect
in the abstract survey environment but that it does not have a major impact on field practices."'
Schwartz, supra note 112, at 942. This should be unsurprising; for the same reason that
employers have an incentive to offer indemnity, they are equally incentivized to assure their
employees they will be indemnified to ensure that they perform their duties vigorously.
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may not) have to represent and indemnify the officers are not our concern." 116
Since, however, the Court has justified qualified immunity in terms of the
potential deterrent effect of the threat of personal liability on the willingness
of public employees to perform their duties with vigor,117 surely evidence
suggesting that this threat is illusory bears on the soundness of the doctrine
itself.
To address the manner in which indemnification undermines the ability
of § 1983 liability to deter public employees from violating the Constitution,
indemnification of law enforcement officials could be curbed or abolished, as
some have proposed. 1 8 There is a potent rejoinder to such proposals,

however; indemnification might undermine the deterrent objectives of § 1983,
but it may also critically advance other statutory objectives, such as the
compensation of plaintiffs. 119 After all, if only the assets of individual public
employees were available to satisfy § 1983 judgments, potential plaintiffs and
their counsel may have inadequate incentives to bring damages actions for
fear that a substantial judgment could not be satisfied from the limited assets
of the typical public official. 120
Indemnification does not eliminate the deterrent effects of damages
awards; instead, it shifts the costs of litigation to public employers.
Accordingly, as many scholars have argued, indemnification gives public
employers an incentive to train, monitor, and supervise their employees in a

manner that reduces the likelihood they will act unlawfully and thereby

116. See, e.g., City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015).
But cf Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641-42, 641 n.3 (1987) ("[E]ven assuming that
conscientious officials care only about their personal liability and not the liability of the
government they serve, the Creightons do not and could not reasonably contend that the
programs to which they refer make reimbursement sufficiently certain and generally available
to justify reconsideration of the balance struck in Harlow and subsequent cases.").
117. See supra text accompanying note 10.
118. For proposals along these lines, see, for example, Emery & Maazel, supra note 113,
at 596-600; Schwartz, supra note 112, at 953-54.
119. See Schwartz, supra note 112, at 891.
120. Id. at 952 ("Widespread indemnification facilitates § 1983's goal of compensating
plaintiffs after a settlement or judgment in their favor. If officers were not indemnified, they
would be personally responsible for satisfying six- and seven-figure settlements and judgments
from their relatively modest annual salaries. Because many law enforcement officers could not
pay the settlements and judgments entered against them, many plaintiffs would go
uncompensated even after a fact finder concluded that their rights were violated. Indemnification
ensures that judgments and settlements will be satisfied from governments' deep pockets."). See
generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Rights Ecosystems, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1565 (2020)
("The City of East Cleveland . . does not have the resources to pay settlements and judgments
entered against it and its officers. East Cleveland is self-insured, so lawsuit payments come from
its general funds. And the city is reportedly on the verge of bankruptcy. As a result, attorneys
who regularly bring civil rights cases against Cleveland are unwilling to sue the East Cleveland
Police Department and its officers." (footnotes omitted)).
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impose costs on the employer. 121 Placing the responsibility to secure

compliance with constitutional law on the public employer, moreover, has the
virtue of practicability. After all, police officers could scarcely be expected to
scour case law and reach their own conclusions about what is "clearly
established law." Surely the sensible regime is to have public employers
develop policies that are binding on all employees and that comply with
constitutional norms-policies on which their employees can then rely. The
Supreme Court itself has occasionally acknowledged that qualified immunity
is appropriate when public employees reasonably rely on the policies of their
employers. 122

Whether the threat of damages liability incentivizes the government to
comply with the law, however, is contested. Daryl Levinson, for example,
observed that the "government responds to political, not market
incentives . . . [and] cares not about dollars, only about votes" 123 and thus
"cannot be expected to respond to forced financial outflows in any socially
desirable, or even predictable, way." 124 The likelihood that the government
will undertake to reduce potential liability is particularly low, he added, when
it comes to activities that are likely to pay political dividends in the eyes of
voters. 125

Professor Levinson's argument seems overstated. If state and local policy
makers were indifferent to damages liability, they would presumably not
bother to seek state laws that confer immunity from damages liability, but

121. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR

OFFICIAL WRONGS 100-21 (1983) (contending public employers should be liable for
constitutional violations committed by their employees within the scope of employment to deter
constitutional violations); Harold S. Lewis & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983's
Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 821, 829-38 (1992) (same).
122. See, e.g., Wilsonv. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) ("[I]mportant to our conclusion
[to grant qualified immunity] was the reliance by the United States marshals in this case on a
Marshals Service ride-along policy that explicitly contemplated that media who engaged in ridealongs might enter private homes with their cameras as part of fugitive apprehension arrests. The
Montgomery County Sheriff's Department also at this time had a ride-along program that did
not expressly prohibit media entry into private homes. Such a policy, of course, could not make
reasonable a belief that was contrary to a decided body of case law. But here the state of the law
as to third parties accompanying police on home entries was at best undeveloped, and it was not
unreasonable for law enforcement officers to look and rely on their formal ride-along policies."
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
123. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 420 (2000).
124. Id. at 348.
125. See id at 370 ("So long as the social benefits of constitutional violations exceed the
compensable costs to the victim and are enjoyed by a majority of the population, compensation
will never deter a majoritarian government from violating constitutional rights, because the
majority of citizens will gain more from the benefits of government activity than they lose from
the taxes necessary to finance compensation payments to victims.").
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such state-law immunities are ubiquitous, as we have seen. 126 The reason why
state and local policy makers seem to like immunity-and are able to convince
state legislators to enact immunity statutes-is not difficult to explain.
Damages liability imposes political costs on the government by diverting

scarce public resources from what policy makers are likely to regard as their
politically optimal uses to the payment of litigation-related costs. 127 These
costs are not insubstantial; in her study, Professor Schwartz found "forty-four
jurisdictions paid an estimated $735,270,772 in settlements and judgments

involving civil rights claims on behalf of their law enforcement officers
between 2006 and 2011."128
Some units of government obtain insurance to cover the costs of
settlements and judgments through risk pools or commercially-provided
insurance, though the largest units of government often self-insure. 129
Insurance, however, does not insulate governments from litigation costs; in
the most comprehensive study of the subject to date, Professor John
Rappaport found that insurers create financial incentives for the governments
they insure to minimize liability through "underwriting and rating-the

processes by which insurers evaluate a risk to decide what coverage, if any,
to offer or renew[] and for what price." 130 Indeed, insurers have a potent
incentive to charge their insureds-including units of government-rates that
reflect their exposure to liability, if only to protect the insurers' bottom
lines.131 Thus, insurance does not eliminate the financial effects of litigation
costs on state and local governments. 132
Litigation also imposes political costs on the government when it brings

governmental misconduct to the public's attention and affixes fault for that
126. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
127. For a more elaborate argument along these lines, see Rosenthal, supra note 86, at
831-41.
128. Schwartz, supra note 112, at 913.
129. See, e.g., John Rappaport, How PrivateInsurersRegulate Police, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1539, 1559 (2017) ("[S]mall municipalities under, say, 100,000 residents tend to join pools.
Midsized entities are divided, with the majority some estimate 70 o-in pools and the rest
insured by commercial carriers. The pooling figure is higher for cities than for counties. And the
largest municipalities the big cities and counties, certainly those with over 500,000 or 750,000
residents, and some well below that point self-insure." (footnotes omitted)).
130. See id at 1587. Moreover, Professor Rappaport found that through denials of
coverage, differentiated premiums, deductibles and self-insured retentions, and limits on
coverage, insurers impose costs on governments that are not taking what the insurers regard as
"adequate efforts" to limit liabilities. Id. at 1588-91. He also found that reinsurers use similar
financial incentives to encourage primary insurers to take measures that limit liability risks. Id.
at 1591-93.
131. See id at 1543-55.
132. See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police

Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1172-73, 1190, 1195 (2016) (discussing indirect financial
effects of litigation on state and local governments).
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misconduct. 133 Indeed, the potential political costs of controversial litigation,
or the political benefits of putting a controversial episode of alleged official
misconduct to rest, may mean that settling some

§ 1983 litigation provides

political benefits that offset the political costs of paying judgments or
settlements. 134 Still, while state and local governments may be willing to pay
handsome settlements to make politically problematic cases go away, it would
be extraordinary if state and local governments were indifferent to the overall
costs of litigation, even if, on occasion, settling certain types of litigation

would prove politically preferable to defending it. I spent more than a decade
in a rather senior position in municipal government, and my superiors made it

quite plain that they were deeply concerned with litigation costs.
Some have nevertheless questioned whether governments are sufficiently
sensitive to costs arising from § 1983 litigation. Damages awards arising from
police misconduct, for example, are generally not paid out of police budgets
but rather out of the larger pool of funds available to meet the general expenses
of the indemnifying unit of government. 13 5 Moreover, while Professor
Schwartz found that some jurisdictions require police budgets to absorb at
least some of the cost of litigation payouts, even then, it is common to budget
in ways that limit the financial impact of litigation costs on police
operations. 136
This pattern should be unsurprising. Regardless of the budgeting scheme
utilized, it is likely politically unacceptable to deny police departments the
133. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent
Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 859-63 (2001) (discussing this
point).
134. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 829 ("If civil litigation is uniquely valuable at
ferreting out governmental misconduct because of the financial incentive that the civil plaintiff
has to pursue such allegations, then elected officials would presumably pay premiums beyond
the amount necessary to compensate the plaintiff in order to settle litigation that might
otherwise cause embarrassment."); see also Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police
and the Mysterious Case of the Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 775-77 (2004)
(noting the prevalence of settlements of police misconduct litigation with confidentiality
provisions that keep settlements secret). For examples in which public employers settled
controversial litigation that could well have been defensible, see Katherine A. Macfarlane,
Accelerated Civil Rights Settlements in the Shadow of Section 1983, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 639,
650-51, 657-58.
135. See,

e.g.,

NAT'L RSCH.

COUNCIL OF

THE NAT'L ACADS.,

FAIRNESS AND

EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 279 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds.,
2004); Miller & Wright, supra note 134, at 781-82; Schwartz, supra note 112, at 956-57;
Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct:A Model
"Pattern or Practice" Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 479, 494-95 (2009).
136. See Joanna C. Schwartz,

Myths and Mechanics

of Deterrence: The Role ofLawsuits

in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1166, 1172-73, 1195 (2010)
(finding that approximately half of jurisdictions surveyed required some contribution to the
payment of judgments from police budgets, but budgetary arrangements rarely produced
meaningful budgetary pressure on police departments).
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resources that police executives contend are essential to protect the public.
This does not mean, however, that governments are insensitive to litigation
costs. If those costs do not come out of the police budget, they must come
from someplace else-in the form of either higher taxes, reductions in other
government services, or both. 137 In this fashion, litigation expenses exact a
political cost as policy makers must expend political capital either by
increasing taxes or by reducing other governmental services that could
otherwise build political support for incumbents.
Accordingly, because indemnification shifts litigation costs from state
and local employees to their employers, the question whether qualified
immunity is justified turns on whether damages liability would have
undesirable effects on state and local government policy absent some form of
immunity.

When it comes to the question whether liability risks shape government
policy, the available evidence is mixed. Professor Schwartz's study of twentysix police departments that had been subjected to external review by courtappointed monitors or external auditors found that most departments rarely, if
ever, use information derived from lawsuits to make personnel and policy
decisions. 138 In a subsequent study of five large departments that analyzed
information generated from litigation, however, she found that although "it is
difficult to pinpoint the role of lawsuits in department decisions" and equally
"difficult to measure the effect of department decisions on line officer
behavior," nevertheless, "lawsuit data has helped identify problems and craft

137. Cf George C. Thomas III, Judges Are Not Economists and Other Reasons To Be
Skeptical of Contingent Suppression Orders: A Response to Professor Dripps, 38 AM. CRIM. L.

REV. 47, 55 (2001) ("The legislature could 'squeeze' the budget of departments that get hit with
many damage awards, but the incentives there are mostly perverse. If the legislature cuts
salaries, then the quality of policing suffers, probably causing more rather than fewer violations,
and less effective policing as well. If the department cuts positions, then policing obviously
becomes less effective and, with less time to investigate cases, perhaps creates more Fourth
Amendment violations in the bargain. Departments could insure against the risk of paying
damages, but insurance simply shifts the costs among departments, depending on how often they
violate the Fourth Amendment; the total cost would be the same plus, of course, a profit for the
insurance company. So it seems pretty clear that something approaching 100% of the cost of the
damage awards would be borne by the taxpayer.").
138. See Schwartz, supra note 136, at 1041-42, 1066-67. Professor Schwartz focused on
jurisdictions that have been subject to external review since those jurisdictions had made
available more information about their policies and practices than most police departments. She
supplemented the information disclosed by those departments with interviews and
correspondence "with knowledgeable practitioners and experts, including court-appointed
monitors of settlement agreements, police auditors, former and currentpolice officials, attorneys
who defend the city and its officers in civil suits, other city officials, and plaintiffs' attorneys and
advocates." Id. at 1042-44 (footnotes omitted).
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interventions in these instances." 139 In his study, Professor Rappaport found
that "[t]o the extent that researchers have identified successful strategies for
combating police misconduct, insurers have been reasonably effective at
inducing police agencies to use them." 1 40 And, Christopher Slobogin has
observed that "[t]he single area in which most police departments have both
rigorous training and systematic administrative rules is in the use of force,
which happens to be one of the few domains where the police are successfully
sued for large sums of money." 14 1
Given the uncertain state of empirical evidence, one should be slow to
embrace the counterintuitive conclusion that state and local policy makers are
indifferent to the cost of damages liability, even if they may not always take
effective action to reduce their exposure to liability in light of the complex
and often conflicting political incentives they face. After all, interventions that
reduce potential liability by deterring police from aggressive crimefighting
might produce what are regarded as politically unacceptable costs. The threat
of liability is likely to put some pressure on state and local governments to
avoid liability-creating behavior, even if that pressure may sometimes be
offset when liability-creating behavior is likely to produce political
benefits. 142

There are, moreover, additional and likely more powerful reasons to be
wary of the effects of governmental damages liability.
2.

The Problematicsof Government Damages Liability

As we have seen, damages liability has different effects on those who seek
to maximize profits or revenues than on the government. 143 Accordingly, the
case for awarding constitutional tort damages against the government
encounters a variety of difficulties not present when assessing tort liability in
the private sector.
Justificatory theories for tort liability can be bifurcated into instrumental
and deontic accounts. The instrumental account justifies tort liability as
139. Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841,
860, 861 (2012).
140. Rappaport, supra note 129, at 1596.
141. Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REV. 363, 396. Charles Epp has made a related point in which he focuses more on norms
than economics. He contends that judicial decisions, by articulating legal constraints on the use
of force, have shaped police behavior. They do so by articulating the legal norms that law
enforcement agencies given their concern about compliance with legal norms come to
internalize. See CHARLES A. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE
CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 59-113 (2009).

142. See Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 842-43 (discussing political calculation governments
must make to determine whether liability-creating behavior is worthwhile).
143. See supra notes 123-142 and accompanying text; Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 847.
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creating an economic incentive to make efficient investments in safety to
reduce exposure to liability. 144 When it comes to the liability of an employer
for the torts of an employee acting within the scope of employment in
particular, on the instrumental view, vicarious liability is justified so that
employers have an incentive both to supervise their employees in a manner
that will reduce losses and to minimize the risk that employees with
insufficient assets to satisfy judgments will have inadequate incentives to
exercise due care. 145 The deontic account focuses on the asserted moral
obligation of those who have injured another to compensate the injured
party. 146 With respect to employer liability in particular, on this view, an
employer is appropriately held liable for the torts of an employee acting within
the scope of employment because the employer bears moral responsibility for
the actions of those working on its behalf. 147 These justificatory theories,
however, have limited application to the public sector.
As for the instrumental account, while a private employer has an
economic incentive to maximize revenues or profits and therefore to make
cost-justified investments in safety, as we have seen, because the public does
not expect the government to maximize revenues or profits, the deterrent
effects of tort liability are more uncertain in the public sector, where the
political costs associated with diverting funds to investments in loss
prevention or with the payment of litigation costs may not always exceed the
political benefits of liability-creating behavior, such as aggressive policing in
the face of rising crime rates. Damages awarded against the government are

therefore unlikely to have the kind of predictable deterrent effect of damages
from private entities that are incentivized to maximize revenues or profits.
To be sure, as we have also seen, there is a political cost when scarce
public resources are diverted to litigation costs and cannot be allocated by

144. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS 135-73 (1970) (exploring prevention of accidents by imposing liability on the
cheapest cost avoider); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 58-77 (1987) (discussing the incentive tort liability creates to invest
in loss prevention); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 8-14 (1987)
(same).
145. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 144, at 120-21; SHAVELL, supra note 144,
at 172-74; Alan Q. Sykes, The Boundaries of VicariousLiability:An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARv. L. REV. 563, 569, 608
(1988).
146. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 303 (1992) (arguing that tort
liability represents a moral conception of corrective justice); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY,
RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 48-69 (Gerald Postema ed., 1999) (arguing that those who
expose others to unreasonable risks have a moral duty to compensate injured parties); ERNEST
J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 145-70 (1995) (arguing that tort law is an example of
corrective justice).
147. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 146, at 185-87.
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elected officials in what they regard as a politically optimal fashion. 148
Moreover, when funds to pay judgments and settlements must be raised either
by increasing taxes or by reducing services provided to the public, politically
accountable officials are likely to pay a political cost. Accordingly, while the
government is unlikely to be indifferent to liability, one cannot confidently
predict that the threat of liability will necessarily incentivize cost-justified
investments in loss prevention. The government will allocate funds to loss
prevention when the political benefits of that allocation exceed its costs, and
this balance may be struck differently as local conditions-and politicschange. It is this uncertainty that presumably explains why Professor
Schwartz found no consistent pattern by which the government seeks to learn
from litigation in order to reduce future liabilities.
Beyond that, a complete accounting of the costs and benefits resulting
from government damages liability must also consider the costs to third
parties, such as the taxpayers who must fund litigation costs or the members
of the public dependent on the government's ability to fund public services.
Although voters might be expected to punish incumbent officials who make
inadequate efforts to reduce tort liability, it is doubtful whether the political
process is adequate to incentivize anything approaching optimal liability-

reducing governmental policies. While the owners of a business or
shareholders of a corporation have a straightforward incentive to demand that
management maximize profits, voters' expectations of the government are far
more wide-ranging. Reducing exposure to liability is unlikely to be a leading
concern of the electorate.
Even worse, if we reasonably assume that the government will usually be
unwilling to incur the political cost of raising taxes in order to pay litigation
costs, the funds necessary to pay these costs are likely to come from reductions
in other government services. And, in the intense political competition for
scarce public resources, the programs most likely to suffer when resources are
diverted to the payment of litigation are those serving those with the least
political influence-most likely the poor and disadvantaged. 149 Indeed, as we
have seen, Professor Schwartz found that litigation costs arising from police
misconduct litigation rarely come out of or otherwise reduce police
budgets. 150 The political cost of denying the police the resources that they
claim are necessary to protect the public is likely to be unacceptably high;
instead, the funds to pay litigation costs are likely to come out of the hides of
those with less political sway and relatively little ability to influence
government policy. Unlike the owners, managers, or shareholders of a private
148. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
149. For a more elaborate argument along these lines, Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 84547.
150. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
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enterprise who can be fairly held accountable when that enterprise fails to
make efficient investments in loss-prevention because of their likely ability to
influence the enterprise's policies (or else divest their stakes in the enterprise),
those most dependent on government services are likely to bear
disproportionate costs resulting from government damages liability, while
having relatively little ability to influence the government policies that
produce those liabilities.
Similarly, while the costs of tort litigation may raise the price of goods
and services paid by the public, this is the consequence of requiring those who
purchase goods and services to internalize the full costs of their distributionincluding the costs of tortious losses flowing from their distribution. In
contrast, when government funding of health care for the poor, for example,
is reduced in order to pay the costs of litigation against the police, rather than
spreading the costs of litigation to the entire population that benefits from
police services, costs are concentrated on a discrete population in a manner
likely disproportionate to the benefits they receive. In this fashion, the poor
and disadvantaged are likely to be the collateral damage of governmental
damages liability.
It may be the case that litigation costs are frequently a small proportion
of state and local budgets, but it may be equally true that often a small
proportion of state and local budgets are likely to be allocated to the needs of
their most disadvantaged and politically powerless constituents. Litigation
costs could therefore have a significant impact on the ability of state and local
governments to aid their most disadvantaged residents. Thus, governmental
liability for damages, even if it imposes some political costs on incumbent
officeholders, is likely to impose significant costs on innocent third parties as
well. 151 One may decry this state of affairs, but it represents a political reality
not likely to change.
Thus, the instrumental case for governmental tort liability is fraught.
There is a case for governmental damages liability but also a case to mitigate
the hardships that unlimited liability may produce, especially when they
involve costs imposed on innocent third parties.
As for the deontic account, given indemnification, the cost of judgments
against public employees come not from the supervisors or policy makers who
have control over the conduct of public employees but rather, as Professor
Levinson wrote, "from the pockets of taxpayers," thereby "attenuat[ing] the

151. Cf John C. Jeffries Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J.
87, 104-05 (1999) ("In itself, the reduction in constitutional violations is an unqualified good,
and it is precisely this benefit that the advocates of strict enterprise liability for constitutional
torts seek to gain. Of course, one would still have to weigh the value of increased constitutional
compliance against the costs of decreased activity levels for the legitimate business of
government." (footnotes omitted)).
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connection between moral responsibility and the burden of rectification." 15 2
To be sure, those who voted for incumbent officeholders that have exercised
insufficient oversight over public employees could be fairly taxed with a duty
to compensate injured parties, but government damages liability must be
funded by all taxpayers, including those who did not vote for incumbents.
Moreover, while residents have the option of voting with their feet by leaving
jurisdictions that face excessive liabilities, this form of exit involves
significant costs as well, which will be especially difficult for poor and
disadvantaged residents to incur. 153 Moreover, because damages may be
awarded many years after the underlying conduct that produced liability,
current officeholders-as well as current taxpayers and residents of the
jurisdiction-may experience the consequences of their predecessors' actions
in a manner that undermines both political and moral accountability.154
The deontic case for imposing liability costs on the government is,
accordingly, no less fraught with complication than the instrumental
justification for government damages liability.155 Perhaps, however, one can
make a more straightforward case for damages liability by focusing solely on
compensation. One could argue, for example, that the government must
compensate those injured by its violations of the Constitution, representing as
it does a kind of fundamental obligation to the governed. 156 The Constitution,
however, does not articulate such an obligation; it requires the payment of
compensation to injured parties only in cases involving the taking of private
property for a public purpose under the Fifth Amendment. 157 In light of this
152. Levinson, supra note 123, at 408.
153. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: PartII Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 420 (1990) ("Interjurisdictional movement is not cost-free. It is
constrained by a variety of economic and social factors that tend to affect poorer people more
than affluent ones. First, there are the out-of-pocket costs of relocation-of picking up, selling
a home or otherwise disinvesting from one's original locality, searching for a new place to live,
transporting one's self and family and finding and paying for a new home. Second, most people
can only reside where they have access to work. Thus, corporate investment decisions and local
zoning regulations that determine the location of jobs, the education and skills requirements that
determine who will be eligible for those jobs and the costs of commuting from home to
workplace all limit ease of movement. Poorer, less educated potential movers will have fewer
options and will be forced to bear more costs if they attempt to move." (footnotes omitted)).
154. Cf John Rappaport, An Insurance-Based Typology of Police Misconduct, 2016 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 369, 384-90 (observing that insurers have limited effect on government policies
with respect to "high dollar-long tail" liability risks such as liability for wrongful convictions).
155. See Levinson, supra note 123, at 408-10.
156. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 289, 293 (1995) ("The insight at the heart of Bivens is that the judiciary has a duty
to enforce the Constitution. To discharge this duty, the Court must ensure that each individual
before it receives an adequate remedy for the violation of constitutional rights. If the remedy is
not forthcoming from the political branches, the Court must provide it." (footnote omitted)).
157. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
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textual limitation on the constitutional obligation of compensation, perhaps
unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court has never recognized an invariable
constitutional duty to pay compensation outside of the Takings Clause.
Although, in Bivens, the Court held that the victims of an unreasonable search
or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment have a right to
recover damages from the federal agents responsible for the violation, despite
the absence of any statute conferring such a right, the Court cautioned that
"[t]he present case involves no special factors counseling hesitation in the
absence of affirmative action by Congress." 158 Subsequently, the Court
stressed that it would not recognize a right to recover damages "when
defendants demonstrate special factors counselling hesitation in the absence
of affirmative action by Congress," or "when defendants show that Congress
has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be
a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective." 159 Beyond that, the Court has repeatedly declined to recognize a
right to recover damages for constitutional violations under Bivens in a variety
of contexts.160 And the Court has held that sovereign immunity bars actions
for damages against the federal government, its agencies, and its
instrumentalities resulting from a constitutional violation. 161
Accordingly, it is difficult to argue that the Constitution embodies an
obligation to pay damages to the victims of constitutional torts. On this point,
aside from Takings Clause, the Constitution is silent. The matter instead
appears to be left to the domain of legislative and common law judgment. 162
158. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
392, 396-97 (1971).
159. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980) (first quoting Bivens, 403 U.S at 39697; and then citing Davis v. Passman, 422 U.S. 228, 245-47 (1979)); accordWilkie v. Robins,
551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).
160. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743-50 (2020) (claims involving crossborder shooting); Ziglarv. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858-65 (2017) (claims involving detention
policy adopted by senior officials after a terrorist attack); Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 554-62 (claim of
retaliation against federal officials for plaintiffs exercise of rights as a property owner);
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421-29 (1988) (claim for wrongful termination of
disability benefits); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298-304 (1983) (claims by enlisted
military personnel); see also Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 ("[E]xpanding the Bivens remedy is now
a 'disfavored' judicial activity. This is in accord with the Court's observation that it has
'consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context or new category of defendants."' (first
quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009); and then quoting Corr. Sews. Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001))).
161. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (first citing Loeffler v. Frank,
486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988); and then citing Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242,244 (1940)).
162. Cf Richard H. Fallon Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1731, 1786-87 (1991) ("[T]he settled law about
the necessary availability of constitutional remedies invites a charge of contradiction. On the
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As a policy matter, there may be a justification for what amounts to
publicly funded constitutional tort insurance. Of all the demands on the
government, however, it is unclear that constitutional tort insurance should be
at the top of the list. If a requirement that the government fund tort insurance
reduces its ability to fund health care for indigent children, for example, it is
far from clear that social welfare of the government's moral standing would
be improved. At most, it seems that the type of policy question regarding
funding priorities is best left to the political process. 163
3.

The Case for QualifiedImmunity

Because both the instrumental and deontic accounts of governmental tort
liability are problematic, there is a case for some form of immunity. The virtue
of qualified immunity, in light of the practical necessity of indemnification, is
that it mitigates the problems that inhere in governmental liability on both the
instrumental and deontic accounts. Qualified immunity permits damages
awards only when officials could not have reasonably believed their conduct
was lawful.

164

Accordingly, qualified immunity effectively requires public

one hand stands a line of cases mandating constitutional remedies and often implying that there
must be an effective remedy for all constitutional violations. On the other hand, cases upholding
sovereign and official immunity reflect the competing view that claims to effective remedies
must sometimes yield to concerns of sovereign necessity and convenience." (footnotes
omitted)).
163. Cf Evan J. Mandery, Commentary, Efficiency Considerations of Compensatingthe
Wrongfully Convicted, 41 CRIM. L. BULL., no. 4, May-June 2005, at 7 ("Insurance theory
suggests that in the open market consumers would not choose to purchase 'constitutional tort
insurance.' Generally speaking, people choose to buy insurance against losses that reduce
wealth, but do not insure against intangible harms, such as emotional distress or affronts to
dignitary [interests], that have no direct or indirect effect on wealth. Since most constitutional
torts cause intangible damages, insurance theory argues that requiring citizens to purchase
insurance against these kinds of injuries reduces their net welfare."); John C. Jeffries Jr.,
Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 82, 93 (1989) ("Why spread only losses caused by constitutional violations? Why not
spread all losses, or at least all losses caused by government? Even if one accepts the (admittedly
unprovable) premise that loss spreading decreases total pain, and even if one discounts the
(probably decisive) impact of transaction costs, it is still not clear how loss spreading justifies
compensation for some losses but not others. Simply put, there is no obvious link between the
general rationale of loss spreading and the specific issue of compensation for injuries resulting
from constitutional violations.").
164. See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) ("The doctrine
of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct 'does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.' A clearly established right is one that is 'sufficiently clear that every reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right."' (citation omitted) (first
quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); and then quoting Reichle v. Howards,
566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) ("Our cases have
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employers to minimize the costs of indemnifying their employees by training
and supervising them to comply with existing legal obligations if they wish to
avoid the political costs of diverting scarce resources to the payment of
judgments. Thus, qualified immunity doctrine incentivizes public employers

to restrain abusive or overzealous officials.
At the same time, qualified immunity protects both public employers and
employees to the extent their legal obligations are uncertain. 165 If liability
were imposed merely because public employees and their supervisors failed
to anticipate future legal developments, state and local governments could
minimize liability only by directing their employees to resolve every
debatable judgment in favor of avoiding liability-creating conduct. Requiring
the government to avoid all liability risks would be problematic. 166
Encouraging timidity of this type might deter public employees from

providing important public services. As one scholar put it, when considering
the conduct of police officers on patrol in words that likely echo the views of
many elected officials:
[W]e don't want police officers to be extremely cautious in stopping
or arresting someone: we want police officers to intervene on the
street and investigate as soon as they have "reasonable suspicion" and
we want them to make an arrest just as soon as they have probable
cause. This is especially true when the crime is serious. 167
Indeed, because it would be politically risky to require that public employees
exercise this degree of caution, politically accountable officials would be
unlikely to adopt such policies even in the face of liability risk. 168 Damages
accommodated these conflicting concerns by generally providing government officials
performing discretionary functions with a qualified immunity, shielding them from civil
damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the
rights they are alleged to have violated."); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)
("[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.").
165. Cf Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) ("As the qualified immunity defense
has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.").
166. Cf Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638 (explaining that the fear of personal liability and
potential litigation will inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties (citing Harlow, 457 U.S.
at 814)).
167. WILLIAM T. PIzzI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH 33-34 (1999).
168. Cf Richard H. Fallon Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80
FORDHAM L. REv. 479, 496-97 (2011) ("If government entities routinely indemnify their
officials, they would certainly have an incentive to provide those officials with training
regarding applicable law, including court decisions. But just as we cannot confidently claim
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awards in such cases, accordingly, would be unlikely to alter government
behavior and would impose serious costs on innocent third parties, such as
taxpayers and those dependent on government services.
Thus, the Supreme Court is onto something when it writes that "the most
important special government immunity-producing concern" is "protecting

the public from unwarranted timidity on the part of public officials." 169 A
regime of damages liability that incentivizes public officials to train,
supervise, and discipline public employees to avoid all liability risks would
breed timidity, the costs of which would accordingly be externalized to the
members of the public that often depend on public employees to discharge
their duties in a vigorous fashion. 10
Beyond that, it is surely a harsh outcome to impose liability merely
because an official follows what is reasonably taken to be existing law, failing
to anticipate its subsequent constitutional rulings, or makes a reasonable effort
to apply existing law to the particular facts that he confronts. By granting
immunity in such cases, qualified immunity, as John Jeffries has argued,
embraces the hardly radical view that damages liability should be premised
on culpable wrongdoing or fault. 171
In this regard, consider the facts of Davis v. United States. 17 2 After a

routine traffic stop, police officers arrested the driver for driving while
to know how widely indemnification occurs, we might doubt how well we understand how the
availability of indemnification would affect the incentives of high level officials to implement
continuing education programs for lower level employees." (footnote omitted)).
169. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 408 (1997) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 506 (1978)).
170. Cf John C. Jeffries Jr., In Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84
VA. L. REV. 47, 73-74 (1998) ("[I]magine a supervisor instructing police officers (as all police
are instructed these days) on the law of the Fourth Amendment. Under the regime
of qualified immunity, the instructor would explain the rules of search and seizure and enjoin
adherence to them, but would also tell the officers that reasonable mistakes would not be held
against them. Now imagine the same situation under a regime of strict liability. The supervisor
would instruct her charges not only to be careful about probable cause but also, and more
importantly, not to search in any doubtful case. Under strict liability, the supervisor would
require a kind of super-probable cause, steering well clear of the constitutional standard in order
to avoid liability for inevitable mistakes. In consequence, there would be fewer searches."
(footnote omitted)).
171. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 163, at 102-03 ("[E]mphasis on fault is entirely
consistent with the argument from corrective justice. It rightly identifies the defendant's state of
mind, not as some extraneous intrusion into the workings of a compensatory regime, but as an
essential feature of the normative basis for imposing liability in the first place . .. [I]mmunity
claims sometimes evoke a hostility born of the suspicion that any limitation on damages liability
for unconstitutional acts is in principle undesirable. This intuition is error. Investigation into the
defendant's fault is entirely appropriate. At least in the absence of an argument based on
incentive effects, the inquiry into fault is essential to the case for awarding money damages for
constitutional violations." (footnote omitted)).
172. 564 U.S. 229 (2011).
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intoxicated and the passenger, Davis, for giving a false name to police and

then conducted a search of the vehicle's interior, consistent with then-binding
precedent permitting such searches incident to an arrest, and recovered a
firearm from Davis's jacket, leading to his prosecution for being a convicted
felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm.173 In a different case, the Supreme
Court subsequently held that the interior of a vehicle may not be searched
incident to the arrest of a recent occupant absent reason to believe that the
vehicle contained evidence of the offense for which the arrest was made, and
accordingly, under the new precedent, the search of Davis's vehicle violated
the Fourth Amendment. 174 In Davis, while acknowledging that the search of

Davis's jacket violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the Court refused to
exclude the evidence obtained as a result of the search, reasoning: "The police
acted in strict compliance with binding precedent, and their behavior was not
wrongful." 1 ?5

There is no more reason to award Davis damages for the search of his
jacket than to bar the use of the jacket as evidence; the search was consistent
with then-existing constitutional doctrine, and the officer therefore complied
with extant law.17 6 To award damages because public officials failed to
anticipate that the law would change would be harsh medicine indeed. 177
When, however, the government's constitutional obligations are clear,
neither individual officials nor those who supervise them are given room by
the Constitution to breach those obligations. 17 8 Accordingly, those who
violate such constitutional commands should be required to pay the economic
and political costs attendant to the payment of damages awards. In such cases,
173. Id. at 235-36.
174. Id. at 239 (discussing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009)).
175. Id. at 240.
176. Cf Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 710-15 (2011) (observing that the Supreme Court
increasingly requires evidence of systemic or intentional violations in order to justify exclusion
of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or to sustain a policy claim against
a municipality in ways that track the qualified immunity defense available to damages claims);
Leah Litman, Remedial Convergence and Collapse, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1477, 1492-97 (2018)
(same).
177. For a similar example, see Fred O. Smith Jr., Formalism, Ferguson, and the Future
of QualifiedImmunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2093, 2108 (2018) ("Imagine a county clerk in
2014 who, because it is against state law, does not award marriage licenses to same-sex
couples . . Our imaginary county clerk, let us add, is gay and believes deeply in marriage
equality. Now imagine that after the United States Supreme Court does find that same sexcouples have a right to marry in 2015, couples who were denied this right in 2014 sue . . for
money damages. They contend that even though the right for same-sex couples to marry was
not clearly established in 2014, it does not matter." (footnote omitted)).
178. Cf Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that officials are
generally shielded from liability for damages insofar as the conduct does not violate a clearly
established constitutional right).
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the argument for forcing the government to pay the price of damages liability
has its greatest force.
Qualified immunity doctrine accordingly represents a middle ground
solution that endeavors to accommodate the prerogatives of state and local
governments without permitting them to be heedless of their constitutional
obligations.179 Qualified immunity doctrine protects public employees and, to
the extent they are indemnified, their employers, as long as they undertake
reasonable efforts to comport with their existing legal obligations. When the
government's constitutional obligations are clear, however, it can legitimately
be faulted for failing to undertake whatever training, supervision, or discipline
is necessary to ensure that public employees understand and comply with
those obligations. On both the instrumental and deontic accounts, the
government should be compelled to pay when it permits public employees to
breach reasonably clear constitutional obligations. When such clarity is
lacking, however, both the instrumental and deontic cases for imposing costs
on the government are far less potent.
As a common law approach to balancing plaintiffs' interests in
compensation, the prerogatives of public employees to resolve legal
uncertainty in a reasonable fashion, and the interests of the taxpayers and
those dependent on the ability of state and local governments to finance public
services, qualified immunity doctrine may not be unassailable, but it surely
seems to be an eminently plausible effort to resolve the tension between these
conflicting and undeniably important interests.
Professor Jeffries has nevertheless complained that "qualified immunity
as currently defined and administered goes well beyond shielding reasonable
error"because "while mere negligence suffices to negate qualified immunity
when there is a factually similar precedent on point, something more is
required when there is not," producing "an overly legalistic and therefore
overly protective shield against liability for constitutional torts." 180 He has
therefore argued that qualified immunity doctrine, rather than focusing on
whether the defendant violated a "clearly established" right, should instead be
refrained to focus on whether the defendant's conduct was "clearly
unconstitutional," an approach "less tied to precedent and less
technical .

. .

. Conduct would be clearly unconstitutional if it contravened

179. Cf id. at 813 ("The resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance
between the evils inevitable in any available alternative.").
180. Jeffries, supra note 110, at 258. He added:
[Q]ualified immunity should hew closely to notice as a proxy for fault. It may be in
some sense unfair to impose liability for conduct that an officer could reasonably have
thought lawful, but it is certainly not unfair to impose liability for conduct that the
officer knew or should have known was wrong. Notice as a proxy for fault does not
require a precedent precisely on point.
Id. at 259 (footnotes omitted).
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factually specific precedent . . or if it clearly and unambiguously
contravened constitutional principles." 181 If, however, on the view advanced
above, qualified immunity is best justified in terms of its effect on the manner
in which public employees are trained and supervised, Professor Jeffries's
reformulation is problematic. Rather than requiring that public employees be
trained to follow extant rules of constitutional law, his approach demands that
they become adept at applying "constitutional principles." 18 2 Training public
employees to apply "principles" instead of "rules" may be no easy feat.

Sometimes constitutional law is stated in terms of relatively abstract
standards, rather than concrete rules that require public officials to act in
specific ways in the face of given facts. 183 There is, indeed, a longstanding
debate between those who advocate a jurisprudence of rules, which mandate
or prohibit particular conduct on given facts, and those who advocate a
jurisprudence of standards, which are bottomed on background legal
principles and therefore necessarily leave greater discretion to the actor called
on to apply them. 184 When constitutional law is stated in terms of standards
181. John C. Jeffries Jr., What's Wrong With Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851,
867-68 (2010) (emphasis omitted). For similar proposals focusing on the manner in which
lawyers and judges would assess a legal claim, see Richard M. Re, ClarityDoctrines, 86 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1497, 1544 (2019) ("[A] court might favor plaintiffs' interests in being made whole and
deny qualified immunity whenever the court is certain that the plaintiffs have suffered a legal
wrong. The court might then grant qualified immunity only if it is at least significantly unsure
of the correct answer."); Michael L. Wells, Qualified ImmunityAfter Ziglar V. Abbasi: The Case
for a Categorical Approach, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 434 (2018) ("The Supreme Court
could . . adopt[] a rule that immunity should not be awarded when there is a factual distinction
but the distinction does not reflect a legally significant difference.").
182. Jeffries, supra note 181, at 868.
183. Cf id at 854 ("[T]he fact-specific, on-the-ground approach does not mesh with the
rhetoric of constitutional law .... ").
184. For present purposes, Kathleen Sullivan's distinction between "rules" and
"standards" will do nicely:
(a) Rules. - A legal directive is "rule"-like when it binds a decisionmaker to
respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts. Rules aim
to confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective
value choices to be worked out elsewhere. A rule captures the background principle
or policy in a form that from then on operates independently. A rule necessarily
captures the background principle or policy incompletely and so produces errors of
over- or under-inclusiveness. But the rule's force as a rule is that decisionmakers
follow it, even when direct application of the background principle or policy to the
facts would produce a different result.
(b) Standards. - A legal directive is "standard"-like when it tends to collapse
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy
to a fact situation. Standards allow for the decrease of errors of under- and overinclusiveness by giving the decisionmaker more discretion than do rules. Standards
allow the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality of the
circumstances. Thus, the application of a standard in one case ties the decisionmaker's
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rather than rules, however, it will be more difficult to expect government
officials, frequently untrained in legal niceties, to conform their conduct to
relatively abstract standards.
For example, employing a relatively abstract standard, the Fourth
Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures," 185 and tracking
this textual formulation, the Court has observed that "reasonableness is always
the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment analysis." 186 Nevertheless, the Court
has acknowledged:
[A] responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by
standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of
government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be
converted into an occasion for constitutional review. Often enough,
the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat)
of the moment, and the object in implementing its command of
reasonableness is to draw standards sufficiently clear and simple to
be applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing
months and years after an arrest or search is made. Courts attempting
to strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment balance thus credit the
government's side with an essential interest in readily administrable
rules. 187

Thus, whatever the virtues of standards or, to use Professor Jeffries
formulation, "constitutional principles," 188 when applicable law is stated at a
relatively high level of generality, it may be far more difficult to expect those
who train and supervise public employees to provide the kind of concrete
guidance that facilitates the kind of supervision that promotes compliance

hand in the next case less than does a rule - the more facts one may take into account,
the more likely that some of them will be different the next time.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22, 58-59 (1992) (footnotes omitted). For an explication of the
debate between members of the Court who have advocated the use of rules and those who
advocate the use of principles, see id at 56-69.
185. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
186. Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017) (alteration omitted)
(quoting Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016)).
187. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (citation omitted). To a
similar effect, see Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 338 (2012) ("Officers
who interact with those suspected of violating the law have an 'essential interest in
readily administrable rules."' (quotingAtwater, 532 U.S. at 347)); Virginiav. Moore, 553 U.S.
164, 175 (2008) ("In determining what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we have
given great weight to the 'essential interest in readily administrable rules."' (quoting Atwater,
532 U.S. at 347)).
188. Jeffries, supra note 181, at 868.
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with the law without producing undesirable over-deterrence.1 89 Accordingly,
when the law is stated at a relatively high level of generality, the manner in
which such a standard is applied may be so fact-sensitive that only precedents
involving a great deal of factual similarity will offer sufficient clarity to justify
a denial of qualified immunity.190 Moreover, it asks too much to expect public
employees to apply standard-like "constitutional principles" rather than more
rule-like commands; Professor Jeffries's proposed reform in qualified
immunity doctrine may do little to improve compliance with the Constitution,
while at the same time imposing significant costs on the taxpayers and those
dependent on the ability of the government to finance public services.
Professor Jeffries offers no data to explain how frequently public employees
are currently

granted immunity for failing

to

grasp "constitutional

principles," 191 but to the extent that the difference between "principles" and
"rules" is meaningful, that difference could well prove difficult for public
employees to grasp and apply.
In any event, if tinkering with qualified immunity doctrine is warranted,

the account advanced here suggests that, in light of the reality of
indemnification, the critical inquiry is whether a public employer could have
been reasonably expected to impose a system of training, supervision, and
discipline sufficient to incentivize employees to avoid a particular liability
risk without undue risk of over-deterrence. It is unrealistic to expect public
employees to know and be able to apply every bit of settled constitutional
doctrine; as Professor Schwartz has observed: "There could never be
sufficient time to train officers about the hundreds-if not thousands-of
court cases that could clearly establish the law." 192 But, if constitutional
doctrine becomes so hopelessly complex that public officials could never be
expected to grasp and comply with it, then constitutional law would cease to
have any real impact on the behavior of public officials. In such a world, the
most we could achieve is a form of publicly funded constitutional tort
insurance. Surely we should aspire to a constitutional jurisprudence with
greater impact on what happens in the real world; constitutional doctrine

189. For a valuable discussion of the case for courts to develop administrable "decision
rules" in constitutional law ratherthan relying on more general principles frequently embodied
in constitutional text, see Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1,
88-100 (2004).
190. Cf Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996) ("Articulating precisely
what 'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause' mean is not possible .... They are . . fluid
concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards
are being assessed." (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983))).
191. See Jeffries, supra note 181, at 867-69.
192. Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity's Boldest Lie, 88 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=365
9540 [https://perma.cc/WF3M-5J5F].
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should be sufficiently comprehensible and rule-like so that public officials can
be realistically expected to learn and comply with it.
To be sure, in especially egregious cases where the illegality of official
conduct is plain, qualified immunity should likely be denied even in the
absence of a breach of a previously announced rule-like formulation of
constitutional law-a point that the Supreme Court has made in its qualified
immunity jurisprudence.193 In the vast majority of cases, however, a focus on
clearly established rights asks the right question-at least if we are to focus
on facilitating effective training, supervision, and discipline of public
employees.19 4 It will be much easier for public employers to expect that their
employees comply with extant rules of constitutional law than to demand that
they also hew to more amorphous, standard-like principles of constitutional
law.

B.

Does Qua/fied Immunity Offer Meaningful Protection?

Even if there is a theoretical justification for qualified immunity along the
lines sketched out above, the question remains whether, in practice, qualified
immunity provides an appropriate middle ground solution to the problems
posed by governmental damages liability. Qualified immunity is often
attacked as constituting a nearly insuperable obstacle to the vindication of
constitutional rights. 195 The empirical evidence, however, suggests that its

193. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) ("[O]fficials can still be on notice that
their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances .... Although earlier
cases involving 'fundamentally similar' facts can provide especially strong support for a
conclusion that the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a finding."). Hope
involved an Eighth Amendment challenge to Alabama's practice of chaining prisoners to
hitching posts for extended periods with limited water and bathroom breaks as a disciplinary
measure. Id. at 733-36. Although Professor Jeffries approved of Hope, he argued that a number
of factors limited its importance:
First, the very extremity of the misconduct in Hope the Court called it "antithetical
to human dignity"-distanced that decision from application to less flamboyant

misbehavior. Second, there were in fact priordecisions very nearly

on point, including

one that outlawed handcuffing inmates to fences and bars for long periods. Thus, even
under a demanding standard of factual similarity, the conduct in Hope stood
condemned. Finally, the Court's subsequent decisions veered back toward requiring
precedential specificity.
Jeffries, supra note 110, at 256-57 (footnotes omitted). More recently, however, the Court has
stressed that on egregious facts, qualified immunity should be denied regardless whether there
are factually similar precedents. See Taylor v. Riojas, No. 19-1261, 2020 WL 6385693, at *2
(U.S. Nov. 2, 2020) (per curiam) ("Confronted with the particularly egregious facts of this case,
any reasonable officer should have realized that Taylor's conditions of confinement offended
the Constitution." (footnote omitted)).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 165-171.
195. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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protections may be much weaker than these critics claim-perhaps even too
weak to accomplish much of anything.
1.

The Effect of Qualified Immunity on Litigation

In her study, Nancy Leong reviewed a random sample of 100 district court
and 100 appellate court opinions involving qualified immunity from three

time periods-the two years preceding the Supreme Court's admonition in
Siegert v. Gilley that lower courts should ordinarily consider the merits of a
constitutional claim before deciding whether it is barred by qualified
immunity, 196 the two years preceding the Court's subsequent and seemingly

mandatory admonition in Saucier v. Katz that lower courts must decide the
merits before reaching qualified immunity, 197 and the two most recent years
for which data was then available (2006-2007).198 The data showed the
following:
Table 11 99
Immunity
Granted; No

Violation
Found and

No

Violation
Found and

Ruling on

Immunity

Violation

Immunity

Merits

Granted

18.6%

3.7%

42.2%

32.3%

Pre-Siegert
(Courts of Appeal)

35.4%

4.2%

34.0%

25.0%

Pre -Saucier
(District Courts)133

13.3%

4.9%

46.0%

32.7%

Pre-Saucier

22.2%

1.4%

52.8%

20.1%

2006-2007
(District Courts)5.0

5.1%

3.6%

61.4%

14.4%

2006-2007

4.5%

(Courts of Appeal)

6.5%

61.9%

26.5%

45

Pre-Siegert

(Distrnct Courts)

Denied

34

(Courts of Appeal)

196. See 500 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1991) (explaining that courts should not assume, without
deciding, that a constitutional right has been violated before proceeding to examine the qualified
immunity claim).
197. 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).
198. For a more complete description of the study's methodology, see Nancy Leong, The
Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 680-88
(2009).
199. This table is derived from id at 711 tbls.3-4.
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The most interesting data come from 2006 and 2007 when, under Saucier,

lower courts were required to decide both whether a constitutional claim was
meritorious and whether it was barred by qualified immunity, so that the effect
of qualified immunity could be considered separately from the merits of a
constitutional claim. 200 During that period, in only 3.6% of cases did a district
court find that a claim had merit but was barred by qualified immunity, and in
only 6.5% of cases did a court of appeals find that a claim had merit but was
barred by qualified immunity. 201 This suggests that qualified immunity bars
only a small fraction of cases. 202 In the earlier periods as well, only a small
fraction of cases were resolved on immunity grounds, 203 although the data
from these periods are confounded by the fact that courts often found a claim
was barred by qualified immunity without deciding whether it was
meritorious.

This result is consistent with other studies. 204 For example, Paul Hughes
examined all published decisions of courts of appeals involving qualified
immunity in 2005 (during the Saucier regime) and found that 42.17% found

no constitutional violation, 10.24% found a constitutional violation for which
damages were barred by qualified immunity, 46.39% found a meritorious
claim not barred by immunity, and 1.2% found immunity without reaching
the merits. 205 Greg Sobolski and Matt Steinberg examined a random sample
of 750 published court of appeals decisions involving qualified immunity and
found that during the Saucierregime, 35.3% of cases found no constitutional
violation, 36.5% of cases found a constitutional violation not barred by
qualified immunity, 13.9% found a constitutional violation for which damages
were barred by qualified immunity, 8.3% found no constitutional violation
200. See id at 674-75 (explaining that the legal landscape changed when Saucier required
that the first inquiry be whether a constitutional right had been violated and the second inquiry
be whether the right was clearly established and thus not barred by qualified immunity).
201. Id. at 711 tbls.3-4.
202. Professor Leong suggested this pattern is attributable to cognitive dissonance, which
could make judges reluctant to acknowledge that a claim has merit but nevertheless is barred by
an immunity defense. Id. at 702-04. It is unclear, however, why judges would experience
cognitive dissonance when awarding immunity, as opposed to grasping the rationale for
immunity in cases in which the Constitution has been violated but, at the time of the underlying
conduct, the defendant reasonably believed the conduct at issue was lawful. Arguably, awarding
damages without finding the defendant knowingly, recklessly, or at least negligently violated
the law could itself produce cognitive dissonance; perhaps an award of damages without fault
could strike a judge as unwarranted.
203. See id at 711 tbls.3-4.
204. But cf Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV.
123, 136 n.65, 145 n.106 (1999) (reviewing qualified immunity decisions over a two-year period
after Siegert and before Saucier and finding only twenty percent denied immunity but
disregarding decisions in which immunity was denied because of disputed issues of fact).
205. See Paul W. Hughes, Not a FailedExperiment: Wilson-SaucierSequencing and the
Articulation of ConstitutionalRights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 418-22, 422 tbl.1 (2009).
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with an alternative holding barred by qualified immunity, and 5.9% of cases
found qualified immunity without reaching the merits. 20 6 Collin Rolfs

examined 100 randomly selected district and court of appeals cases involving
qualified immunity and found that during the Saucier regime, only 8.8% of

appellate cases and 4.5% of district court cases found a constitutional
violation but granted qualified immunity. 207 In a review of Bivens litigation in
five selected judicial districts from 2001 to 2003 (mostly following Siegert),

Alexander Reinart found that qualified immunity was the basis for dismissal
in only five of the 244 complaints studied. 208
Eight years after Saucier, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Court changed

course and held that the lower courts were no longer required to reach the
merits if they could dispose of a case by granting qualified immunity. 209
Because Pearson permitted lower courts to grant qualified immunity without

reaching the merits,2 10 cases decided after Pearson are less useful in isolating
the effects of qualified immunity than cases decided under the Siegert regime,
but the post-Pearson data nevertheless suggest that qualified immunity has
limited effects.211

For example, Ted Sampsell-Jones and Jenna Yauch, examining all
published post-Pearson appellate cases involving qualified immunity
defenses between 2009 and 2010, found that a constitutional violation was

found but damages were barred by qualified immunity in only 7.9% of
published court of appeals cases, while the court found qualified immunity
without reaching the merits in 1 9 .5 % of cases.2 1 2 Professors Nielson and
Walker examined all court of appeals decisions from 2009 through 2012 that
involved qualified immunity and cited Pearson and found that while courts
found a claim was barred by qualified immunity without reaching the merits

206. See Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An EmpiricalAnalysis of Section 1983
Qualified Immunity Actions andthe Implications ofPearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523,
540-42, 545 tbl.1 (2010).
207. See ColinRolfs, Comment, Qualified Immunity After Pearsonv. Callahan, 59 UCLA

L. REV. 468, 489, 496 tbl.l, 497 tbl.2 (2011).
208. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its
Consequencesforthe IndividualLiability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 813, 835, 843, 845 tbl.4
(2010).
209. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235-36 (2009) (explaining that the two-step
protocol under Saucier is no longer mandatory).
210. See id at 236 (holding that lower courts should be permitted to exercise their
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs should be addressed first).
211. See, e.g., Ted Sampsell-Jones & Jenna Yauch, Measuring Pearson in the Circuits, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 623, 627-28, 628 tbl.1 (2011); Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker,
The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 30, 33-34, 37 (2015).
212. Sampsell-Jones & Yauch, supra note 211, at 627-28, 628 tbl.l.
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in 26.7% of cases, courts found a constitutional violation for which damages
were barred by qualified immunity in only 3.6% of cases. 2 13

One might be concerned that studies of judicial opinions-especially
appellate opinions-are infected by a form of selection bias. Perhaps cases
that result in written opinions or that are appealed are not typical of most civil
rights litigation. 2 14 That problem is avoided by Professor Schwartz's study. 21
She reviewed the dockets of § 1983 cases filed against police officers and
other law enforcement officials in five judicial districts in 2011 and 2012,216
and found that qualified immunity was raised in only 37.6% of all

§ 1983

cases in which that defense was available. 2 17 The vast majority of these efforts
to claim qualified immunity were unsuccessful:

213. Nielson & Walker, supra note 211, at 30, 34, 37.
214. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenburg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried
Cases: FurtherExploration ofAnti-PlaintiffAppellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
659, 674 fig.5, 676 fig.7, 677 fig.8 (2004).
215. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 20-21 (reviewing court dockets rather than published
opinions in order to study how often the defense of qualified immunity is raised, how motions
raising qualified immunity are decided, and how qualified immunity impacts case dispositions).
216. For a description of the study's methodology, see id. at 19-25.
217. Id. at 29 tbl.2. There was considerable variation among the five districts studied, with
qualified immunity raised in 54.7% of cases in the Southern District of Texas but only 23.9% of
cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id.
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Table 2218

Qualified Immunity Denied

31.6%

Qualified Immunity Granted in Part

5.9%

Qualified Immunity Granted in Full

12.0%

No Constitutional Violation Established

11.4%

Motion Granted Without Discussing

14.1%

Qualified Immunity
Motion Granted-Reasoning Unclear

2.0%

Motion Granted Without Mentioning
Qualified Immunity or Mentioning It in

5.9%

the Alternative
Motion Not Decided

17.0%

Based on the low rate at which § 1983 defendants obtain the protection of
qualified immunity, Professor Schwartz concluded that qualified immunity
"is ill suited to dispose of many cases before trial" and "unnecessary to shield
defendants from discovery and trial." 2 19

One could, to be sure, question Professor Schwartz's methodology and
conclusions. For example, as Professors Nielson and Walker observed, "she
only counted cases dismissed on the grounds of qualified immunity if the

entire case has been dismissed as a result of the motion," and added, "if you
consider all of the decisions that granted qualified immunity in full or in part
or in the alternative, it totals 29.3% of the qualified immunity motions filed,"
while "ignor[ing] settlements, voluntary dismissals, and all other means of
dismissal." 220

218. Table 2 is derived from id. at 36-37, 37 tbl.6. There was substantial variation among
districts, with qualified immunity faring best in the Southern District of Texas, where it was
denied in 21.7% of motions and granted in part or full in 33.3% of motions, while the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted qualified immunity motions in whole or part in only 6.1% of
cases. Id. at 37. In another study that examined dockets rather than judicial opinions, Alexander
Reinert found that in cases where qualified immunity was raised and went to trial before a jury,
no jury instruction or special interrogatory on qualified immunity was proposed by the parties
in 70.3% of those cases. Alexander A. Reinert, Qualified Immunity at Trial, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2065, 2081 n.88, 2082-83, 2083 tbl.1 (2018).
219. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 52-53, 56.
220. Nielson & Walker, supra note 40, at 1879-80 (footnotes and internal quotations
omitted). For a more elaborate discussion of the effects of qualified immunity on settlements,
see id. at 1880-82.
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An even more fundamental problem with assessing the effects of
qualified immunity in terms of judicial rulings-or even cases filed-is that
these datasets are skewed by the selection effects of qualified immunity. In
what is likely the leading treatment of the subject, George Priest and Benjamin
Klein demonstrated that litigated disputes "will constitute neither a random
nor a representative sample of the set of all disputes." 221 Assuming that a
potential litigant makes decisions "based on his individual knowledge of the
facts of the dispute and his prediction of how those facts will be interpreted
by a court or jury[,]" 222 they concluded that "the likelihood that the dispute
will be litigated increases" under circumstances in which "the difference in
the parties' probability estimates of the outcome is likely to increase." 223 This
insight has important implications for qualified immunity.
2.

The Selection Effects of QualifiedImmunity

If we assume plaintiffs and their attorneys make rational economic
decisions, they can be expected to file suit when their estimate of the expected
recovery exceeds the costs of bringing suit. 224 The analysis that plaintiffs'
attorneys are likely to undertake suggests that the defense of qualified
immunity will have important effects on which § 1983 cases they choose to
file.
Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, in

§ 1983

litigation, a "prevailing party" may recover its attorney's fees as part of the
recoverable costs of litigation. 225 The Supreme Court has interpreted the
statute to mean that a prevailing plaintiff "'should ordinarily recover an
attorney's fee' from the defendant," but it only "authorizes a district court to
award attorney's fees to a defendant 'upon a finding that the plaintiff's action
221. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984). As one more recent treatment put it:
Although there exist many alternative models of settlement, the Priest Klein model
offers elegance and simplicity, and remains a canonical model of the selection of
cases for trial. Indeed the model has been cited in the legal and economic literature
more than 500 times, making it the third-most cited paper in the history of The
JournalofLegal Studies.
Marc Poitras & Ralph Frasca, A Unified Model of Settlement and Trial Expenditures: The
Priest Klein Model Extended, 31 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 188, 188 (2011).
222. Priest & Klein, supra note 221, at 9.
223. Id. at 16.
224. For a more elaborate explication of the point, see Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement,
and Trial: A TheoreticalAnalysis UnderAlternative Methodsfor Allocation of Legal Costs, 11
J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 56-62 (1982).
225. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, ... the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs .... ") (codifying as amended Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976)).
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was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation."' 226 Such asymmetrical
fee-shifting, by reducing the plaintiff's costs of litigation, should both increase
the rate at which litigation is filed and decrease the rate of settlement by
reducing a plaintiff's incentive to settle. 227 Nonetheless, the available
empirical evidence, while sparse, does not reflect dramatic increases in filing
rates associated with the advent of asymmetrical fee-shifting in 1976.228
Of course, even with asymmetrical fee-shifting, plaintiffs' attorneys, who
recover fees only if they prevail, have an incentive to bring only cases likely
to have sufficient merit to generate revenue. After all, if we reasonably assume
that most potential plaintiffs cannot afford to front both the costs of litigation
and attorney's fees, then even with the benefit of asymmetrical fee-shifting,
plaintiffs' attorneys assume the risk their work will go uncompensated when
they file a case-only if the plaintiff recovers attorney's fees through a
judgment or settlement will the plaintiff's attorney obtain compensation. 229
The risks assumed by a plaintiff's attorney in civil rights litigation are
therefore likely to drive decisions about whether to file a case. 230 The

&

226. Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 833 (2011) (quoting Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412, 416, 421 (1978)).
227. For a more elaborate explanation of the point, see generally Stewart J. Schwab
Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney
Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 745-49 (1988).

228. For a detailed review of the evidence supporting this conclusion, see Margaret H.

Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 805-09 (2011).
229. Cf Pamela H. Bucy, PrivateJustice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 35 (2002) (observing that
in environmental litigation, "[a]lthough attorneys' and expert witnesses' fees potentially are
available to successful citizen suit plaintiffs, paying the up-front costs can be so prohibitive that
only well-funded groups can afford to bring citizen suits").
230. This discussion, of course, has limited application to pro se plaintiffs, who may be
less willing or able to make judgments about whether litigation they wish to undertake is likely
to be cost-justified. Nonetheless, governmental defendants have more reason to be concerned
about counseled than uncounseled plaintiffs since the limited empirical evidence available
suggests that pro se plaintiffs are more likely to have their cases dismissed prior to trial, and pro
se plaintiffs may have less ability to select cases likely to have merit. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, A
New Look: Dismissal Rates of Federal Civil Claims, 96 JUDICATURE 127, 134 (2012)
(documenting higher rates of dismissal of complaints in pro se cases and suggesting that the
selection effects of legal rules favoring defendants are more pronounced in cases brought by
counsel); Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Plaintiphobiain the Supreme Court,
100 CORNELL L. REV. 193, 204-10 (2014) (documenting higher rates of pretrial adjudication in
pro se cases and suggesting that the selection effects of legal rules favoring defendants are more
pronounced in cases brought by counsel); Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative
Study onlqbal's Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 609-22 (2012)
(documenting higher rates of dismissal of complaints in pro se cases); Alexander A.
Reinert, Measuringthe Impact ofPlausibilityPleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117, 2143-51 (2015)
(same); Joanna C. Schwartz, QualifiedImmunity's Selection Effects, 114 Nw. U. L. REV. 1101,
1130 & nn. 121, 123 (2020) (finding in the five jurisdictions studied that 16.1% of cases brought
by pro se plaintiffs resulted in settlement, voluntary dismissal, or a plaintiff verdict, while 71%
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economic calculation facing a plaintiff's attorney aiming to maximize
compensation is straightforward: if C is the attorney's expected
compensation, P is the probability of obtaining that compensation, and OC is
the opportunity cost of selecting the plaintiff's case rather than taking on other
work, a plaintiff's attorney interested in maximizing compensation will bring
a case only when the expected compensation exceeds the opportunity costwhen C(P) > OC.23i
It follows that, all other things being equal, we should expect plaintiffs'
attorneys to allocate their time and resources to cases in which the likelihood
of prevailing is relatively higher, since this will increase their expected
compensation. 23 2 This suggests that plaintiffs' counsel will be reluctant to take
cases facing a powerful defense, such as qualified immunity. 233 Indeed, one
of the few studies of the subject-a survey of Wisconsin practitioners who
work on a contingency fee basis-found that "lack of liability and inadequate
damages (singly or together) are the dominant reasons for declining cases,
accounting for about 80 percent."

23 4

To be sure, some plaintiffs' attorneys may litigate for ideological rather
than economic reasons, but even ideologically-motivated lawyers have reason
to prefer bringing cases that are more likely to produce success than failure
and that are more likely to enhance their reputation, impact, and financial
ability to fund future litigation. 235 It is reasonable to assume that most lawyers
of counseled plaintiffs obtained one of these outcomes, even though only 3.6% of counseled
cases and 1.5% of pro se cases were dismissed on qualified immunity).
231. Cf John C. Coffee Jr., Understandingthe Plaintiff'sAttorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for PrivateEnforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86

COLUM. L. REv. 669, 681 n.35 (1986) ("In principle, attorneys should continue to litigate a case
so long as they are covering their opportunity costs.").
232. See, e.g., William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at PlausibilityPleading, 83 U. CHI. L.
REv. 693, 707 (2016) ("[I]f the decisionmaker is the plaintiffs' attorney working on a
contingency basis, the attorney must weigh the expected fees earned through litigation against
the costs of bringing the suit. Indeed, given a limited budget of time and credit (for litigation
expenses) that he can extend to his clients, an attorney working on contingency must concentrate
his efforts on cases with the highest settlement value.").
233. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Albrecht, ConfrontingGovernmentalImpunity and Immunity
"FromBelow," 53 VAL. L. REv. 47, 60-61 (2018) ("Fearing qualified immunity may preclude
any judicial analysis that incorporates their clients' perspective 'from below,' civil rights
attorneys are often loathe to file cases seeking to expand substantive legal principles and
damages remedies."); Donald Dripps, The FourthAmendment, the ExclusionaryRule, and the
Roberts Court: Normative and Empirical Dimensions of the Over-Deterrence Hypothesis,

85 CHI-KENT L. REv. 209, 235 (2010) ("Attorneys may discourage plaintiffs likely to lose a
summary judgment based on immunity.").
234. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE
LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 47, 84 (2004).

235. See, e.g., Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 227, at 744-45 ("[L]ess concern for money
does not necessarily translate into a less successful litigation record. Even publicly spirited
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prefer to be compensated for their work, and there is little reason to believe
that civil rights plaintiffs' lawyers are so wealthy that they are indifferent to
the likelihood that their work will be compensated. 23 6
Of course, there are limits to the ability of plaintiffs' attorneys to
accurately assess the likelihood of prevailing at the outset of litigation. 23 7 Prior
to discovery and trial, plaintiffs' attorneys will sometimes have insufficient
information to reliably assess the likelihood of prevailing when, for example,
there is important evidence within the exclusive control of the defendants. 238
To use one example, a client's claim that she was subjected to excessive force
by arresting officers may be difficult to assess until counsel has been able to
obtain all pertinent evidence through discovery, including the facts and
circumstances that were known to the arresting officers but that may have
been unknown to the arrestee.239 This type of uncertainty breeds litigation; as
we have seen, when the parties' estimates of the likely outcome differ,
litigation-rather than settlement-becomes more likely. 240
When it comes to qualified immunity, however, there is reason to believe
that attorneys will be able to assess the strength of this defense at higher rates
than many other types of litigation risks. 241 As we have seen, qualified
counsel or public interest law firms, who may have less concern with short-term victories than
with long-term goals, have a strong preference for winning. Indeed, achieving the long-term
victories, to a certain extent, requires short-term victories. Moreover, few entities have their
reputations enhanced, or their budgets increased, by consistently losing."); cf Catherine A.
Albiston & Laura Beth Neilsen, The ProceduralAttack on Civil Rights: The EmpiricalReality
of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1087, 1120-31 (2007)
(reporting the results of a survey of public interest organizations finding their efforts were
impaired by a Supreme Court decision limiting the availability of attorney's fees).
236. Cf KathrynA. Sabbeth, What's Money Got to Do With It? PublicInterestLawyering
and Profit, 91 DENy. U. L. REv. 441, 489 (2014) ("Small, for-profit firms are the main
individual enforcers of civil rights laws, and they too cannot afford to pursue public interest

lawyering for free." (footnote omitted)).
237. See, e.g., Priest & Klein, supra note 221, at 9 ("Priorto trial, neither litigant can know
with certainty which party will subsequently prevail.").
238. See, e.g., id. ("Some of the facts or circumstances of the dispute may be unavailable
before trial, or may be developed in an unexpected manner .... "). For one effort to consider the
problem of asymmetrical access to information and its effect on litigation, see generally Steven
Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 49497 (1996).
239. Cf Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1989) ("[Claims of constitutionally
excessive force under § 1983] require[] careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest by flight .... The 'reasonableness' of a particularuse of force must
be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight." (citation omitted)).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 221-234.
241. Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477,
493-94 (2011).
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immunity turns on an objective assessment of whether the defendant violated
clearly established law.242 Accordingly, as the Supreme Court has explained,
this involves an assessment of "an 'abstract issu[e] of law' relating
to qualified immunity, typically, the issue of whether the federal right
allegedly infringed was 'clearly established."' 24 3 Qualified immunity will
therefore provide protection in close cases; for example, the Supreme Court
has observed that even when police officers make an arrest unsupported by
probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment, "the officers are
'reasonably but mistakenly
entitled to qualified immunity [when] they 244
conclude[d] that probable cause [wa]s present."'

The question whether the evidence available to plaintiff's counsel at the
outset of the litigation, if believed, establishes a violation of clearly
established law involves a purely legal analysis, rather than guesswork about
how the evidence will develop through discovery and trial. 245 To be sure,
when they first decide to file a case, plaintiffs' lawyers will be unable to make
judgments about the strength of a potential qualified immunity defense with
perfect accuracy-the data in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that qualified immunity
is awarded in roughly one-fifth of cases, and Professor Schwartz's study
indicates that in the majority of these cases, qualified immunity was granted
at the summary judgment stage, most likely because of evidence adduced in
discovery rather than a mistaken judgment about qualified immunity made by
plaintiff's counsel at the outset of the litigation. 246 In the clear majority of
242. See supra Section II.A.1.
243. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996) (first alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995)); accord Elder v. Holloway, 510
U.S. 510, 516 (1994) ("Whether an asserted federal right was clearly established at a particular
time, so that a public official who allegedly violated the right has no qualified immunity from
suit, presents a question of law, not one of 'legal facts."'); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
528 (1985) ("[Qualified immunity involves] a question of law: whetherthe legal norms allegedly
violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions .... ").
244. District of Columbiav. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 591 (2018) (second and third alteration

in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)).
245. See Elder, 510 U.S. at 516 ("Whether an asserted federal right was clearly established
at a particular time, so that a public official who allegedly violated the right has
no qualified immunity from suit, presents a question of law, not one of 'legal facts. "').
246. In her study, Professor Schwartz separately considered motions raising qualified
immunity on the pleadings and at summary judgment, and she found that at the pleadings,
qualified immunity motions were granted in full in only 9.1% of cases and granted in part in
only 4.5% of case, while, at the summary judgment stage, qualified immunity motions were
granted in full in 13.8% of cases and granted in part in 6.7% of cases. Schwartz, supra note 215,
at 38 tbl.7, 39 tbl.8. Although qualified immunity motions made at the pleading stage consider
only the facts alleged by the plaintiff, at the summary judgment stage, courts must consider the
evidence adduced by the parties. See, e.g., Behrens, 516 U.S. at 309 ("[T]he legally relevant
factors bearing upon the Harlow question will be different on summary judgment than on an
earlier motion to dismiss. At that earlier stage, it is the defendant's conduct as alleged in the
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cases, however, it appears that plaintiffs' counsel were able to make a correct
assessment about the likelihood that a case they chose to file would be barred
by qualified immunity. If anything, given the powerful financial incentives of

plaintiffs' attorneys to refrain from filing cases likely to confront a potent
qualified immunity defense, the fact that nearly one-fifth of filed cases
encounter a successful assertion of that defense suggests that it retains
considerable power even in light of plaintiffs' attorneys incentives to screen
out cases facing a strong qualified immunity defense.
More important, data reflecting cases actually filed ignores the screening
effects of qualified immunity. 247 The data in Tables 1 and 2 above ignore the
possibility that qualified immunity may have dramatic effects in terms of
preventing large numbers of cases from being filed 24 8-thereby
saving
substantial funds that might otherwise be expended on litigation costs and the
payment of judgments and settlements.
Of course, it is difficult to identify the number and potential costs
associated with cases that are never filed because of a potential qualified
immunity defense. The only available empirical evidence involves interviews
with plaintiffs' attorneys, but that evidence suggests qualified immunity has
important screening effects.
For example, when interviewing civil rights attorneys in the San
Francisco area about whether to bring litigation, Julie Davies found the
following:
[P]laintiffs' attorneys interviewed mentioned changes in substantive
law as a factor that has made practicing civil rights law more
difficult .... Several attorneys conducting police misconduct
litigation focused on qualified immunity as a substantial obstacle,

complaintthat is scrutinized for 'objective legal reasonableness.' On summary judgment,
however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on the pleadings, and the court looks to the evidence
before it (in the light most favorable to the plaintiff) when conducting the Harlow inquiry."
(citation omitted)). Thus, at least some cases where qualified immunity is granted at the
summary judgment stage likely involve unexpected evidence that emerged during discovery and
that strengthened the immunity defense.
247. See Schwartz, supra note 230, at 1104 ("It is also conventional wisdom that it is
exceedingly difficult to measure which grievances are never pursued in court, or to measure the
impact of particular doctrines or other considerations on the case-selection process.").
248. See id. at 1112 ("If qualified immunity decreases the probability of success, decreases
the size of a judgment, and/or increases the costs of litigation, then under prevailing models of
attorney case-selection decisions, attorneys will be less willing to accept cases in which qualified
immunity is likely to be raised and especially unwilling to accept cases where the defense is
likely to be successful.").
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although those practicing in the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the issue
was easier to win there than elsewhere. 249

Similarly, Alexander Reinart interviewed attorneys representing
plaintiffs in Bivens litigation and found, "Nearly every respondent, regardless
of the breadth of her experience, confirmed that concerns about the qualified
immunity defense play a substantial role at the screening stage." 25 0
Professor Schwartz reached a somewhat different conclusion. She
interviewed thirty-five plaintiffs' attorneys handling police misconduct cases
in the five judicial districts that she studied, 251 and in that survey, "[t]hirteen
lawyers . . report[ed] that they do not take qualified immunity into account
when selecting cases, and another eleven report[ed] rarely declining cases
because of qualified immunity." 252 This finding is hedged, however, since the
attorneys who reported they rarely or never considered qualified immunity at
the screening stage identified "other concerns [that] duplicate and thereby
minimize qualified immunity concerns," such as "select[ing] cases with facts
so egregious and evidence so strong that the cases are not vulnerable to
dismissal on qualified immunity grounds." 253 Other lawyers reported
screening out "federal claims that cannot be dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds-including claims for injunctive relief and claims against
municipalities-when they think qualified immunity could be an issue." 254

Professor Schwartz's interviews provide, at best, highly equivocal
evidence about the selection effects of qualified immunity. 255 The majority of
the lawyers she interviewed (twenty-two of thirty-five) considered potential
qualified immunity defenses at the screening stage to some extent, and
lawyers who focus on the egregiousness of a violation may have no need to
consider qualified immunity given that egregious fact patterns are likely to

249. Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990's: The Dichotomy Between
Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 243-44 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
250. Reinert, supra note 241, at 492.
251. For a description of her methodology, see Schwartz, supra note 230, at 1114-19. In
particular, of the 1,022 attorneys who appeared in the cases in her dataset, ninety-four responded
to an online survey and twenty-five of those agreed to be interviewed. Professor Schwartz
solicited interviews from an additional twenty-five attorneys based on their reputation for being
involved in police misconduct litigation, and ten of these agreed to be interviewed. Id. at 111516. It is unclear whether the somewhat self-selected thirty-five interviewed attorneys were a fair
cross-section of plaintiffs' attorneys, although Professor Schwartz found no evidence that they
were unusual in terms of the volume of cases they handled or their practice settings. See id. at
1118-19. Still, one wonders whether attorneys who volunteer to be interviewed about their case
selection methods are in some respects atypical.
252. Id. at 1131.
253. Id. at 1138.
254. Id. at 1140.
255. See id. at 1117-18.
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overcome qualified immunity. 256 Surely more compelling evidence should be
required to embrace the surprising view that plaintiffs' attorneys are willing
to bring cases that are likely to be losers, both legally and financially. 257
At a minimum, it is likely that damages claims based on novel or
uncertain legal theories or based on evidence of a constitutional violation that
is close would become considerably more attractive to plaintiffs' lawyers in
the absence of qualified immunity, especially in light of the incentive to sue
created by asymmetrical fee-shifting. For that reason, it seems unwarranted to
conclude that qualified immunity offers no meaningful protections to the
public fisc in protecting governmental defendants from the costs of litigating
a substantial volume of cases.
C.

Does QualifiedImmunity Inhibit Development of the Law?

In Pearson, the Supreme Court held that lower courts are free to reach a
qualified immunity defense without deciding whether the plaintiff has
established a constitutional violation. 258 The Court reasoned that ruling on the
merits of a claim before deciding whether it is barred by qualified immunity
"sometimes results in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on
difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the case," and
therefore "wastes the parties' resources." 259 The Court added that there will
sometimes be little value in deciding whether the plaintiff has established a
constitutional violation in a case barred by qualified immunity, such as when
"the constitutional question is so factbound that the decision provides little
guidance for future cases," when "the question will soon be decided by a
higher court," when the case involves "[a] constitutional decision resting on
an uncertain interpretation of state law," "[w]hen qualified immunity is
asserted at the pleading stage, [when] the precise factual basis for the
plaintiff's claim or claims may be hard to identify," or when "the briefing of
constitutional questions is woefully inadequate."260
256. Cf Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198-99 (2004) (per curiam) (observing that,
even without factually similar precedents, qualified immunity can be denied "in an obvious
case"); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740-41 (2002) ("Arguably, the violation was so obvious
that our own Eighth Amendment cases gave respondents fair warning that their conduct violated
the Constitution.").
257. Cf Fallon, supra note 15, at 976 ("[W]hatever the current situation, screening effects
will likely increase over time as experience instructs repeat players on the potency of the
qualified immunity defense.").
258. See Pearsonv. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235-36 (2009).
259. Id. at 236-37.
260. Id. at 237, 238-39. Beyond that, "there will be cases in which a court will rather
quickly and easily decide that there was no violation of clearly established law before turning to
the more difficult question whether the relevant facts make out a constitutional question at all,"
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Because Pearson permits courts to award qualified immunity without

deciding whether the plaintiff has established a constitutional violation, a
number of commentators have argued that qualified immunity inhibits the

development of constitutional law by inviting courts to reject novel claims on
qualified immunity grounds without deciding the merits. 26 1

To be sure, as the Court observed in Pearson, constitutional law can be
articulated in cases in which qualified immunity is not a defense, "such as
criminal cases and

§ 1983 cases against a municipality, as well as § 1983 cases

against individuals where injunctive relief is sought instead of or in addition
to damages." 262 Nevertheless, as we have seen, this is not a complete answer;

injunctive relief is frequently unavailable, and § 1983 suits for alleged
constitutional violations cannot be brought against the federal and state
governments. 263 Claims barred by qualified immunity can also be barred by
other doctrines, including those that limit the exclusion of unconstitutionallyobtained evidence in criminal cases as a remedy for a constitutional violation
and those that limit the § 1983 claims that can be advanced against municipal
defendants for constitutional violations committed by their officials. 264
The question whether qualified immunity has inhibited the development
of constitutional law is ultimately an empirical question that should therefore
be answered by considering empirical evidence.

creating "a risk that a court may not devote as much care as it would in other circumstances to
the decision of the constitutional issue." Id. at 239. The Court added that requiring a court to
reach the merits of a constitutional claim despite the availability of a potentially dispositive
qualified immunity defense "departs from the general rule of constitutional avoidance and runs
counterto the older, wiserjudicial counsel not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . unless
such adjudication is unavoidable." Id. at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 388 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
261. See, e.g., Karen M. Blum, Qualfied Immunity: Time to Change the Message, 93

NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1887, 1893-905 (2018); Nielson & Walker, supra note 15, at 20; Pfander,
supra note 73, at 1605, 1617-18; Schwartz, supra note 11, at 1815-18. But cf Leong, supra
note 198, at 670-71 (arguing on the basis of case analysis and psychological research that judges
who award qualified immunity are more prone to reject claims on their merits to avoid
acknowledging an unremedied violation of rights and, therefore, requiring courts to reach the
merits before considering qualified immunity is more likely to reduce the extent to which the
law is developed in a way that aids defendants than to expand rights).
262. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
264. See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA.
L. REv. 687, 722-23, 724, 734-38 (2011) (observing that policy claims are barred against state
and local governments, that policy claims against municipal defendants are often difficult to
prove, that injunctive relief is frequently unavailable, that qualified immunity frequently bars
damages claims, and that exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence is increasingly
unavailable when the illegality of a search is not clearly established).
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EmpiricalEvidence ofStagnation

As we have seen, a number of studies have examined lower court opinions
involving qualified immunity and have determined how many of these

decisions rest on immunity and how many reach the merits, during the period
of time when Saucier required lower courts to decide the merits before
reaching qualified immunity and when Pearson granted lower courts

discretion about whether to reach the merits.265 Table 3 summarizes the results
of the various studies (although, because the various studies spanned different
time periods, none of them include data for all of the relevant time periodsthat is, pre-Saucier litigation, post-Saucier litigation, and post-Callahan
litigation):

265. See supra Section III.B.1.
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Table 3266

PreSaucier

Qualified
Immunity

Denied

PostSaucier

Leong

SobolskiSteinberg

Hughes

20.1%

28.6%

25.8%

26.5%

36.5%

46.4%

PostPearson

PreSaucier

Qualified
Immunity
Granted

Post-

.c
Saucier

22.2%

4.5%

1

28.1%

5.9%

No
Violation

PostSaucier

52.8%

37.7%

45.7%

61.9%

43.6%

42.2%

Pearson

Saucier

Violation/
Qualified

Post-

Immunity

Saucier

27.7%

1

19.5%

1

26.7%

55.3% 1 34.7%

1

41.9%

18.9%

Post-

Pre-

1

1.2%

Pearson

Saucier

22.6% 1 37.9%

1 25.8%

Post-

Pre-

NielsonWalker

JonesRauch

Rolfs

1.4%

5.5%

2.7%

6.5%

13.9%

10.2%

Granted
PostPearson

2.5%

1

7.9%

3.6%

266. Table 3 is derived from Nielson & Walker, supra note 211, at 37 tbl.1.
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Although differences between the datasets and time-periods covered in
each study pose apples-and-oranges problems, some patterns emerge. All of
the studies found that the rate at which qualified immunity was granted
without reaching the merits rose after Pearson. This should be unsurprising;
under Saucier, lower courts were generally required to decide whether the

plaintiff had established a constitutional violation before considering qualified
immunity, whereas Pearsonreturned to a regime in which lower courts had
discretion to grant qualified immunity without reaching the merits. 267

Thus, as Table 3 illustrates, the three studies of cases decided during the
Saucier regime found that courts awarded qualified immunity without
reaching the merits in only 4.5%, 5.9%, and 1.2% of cases, while, after
Pearson, three studies found that courts failed to reach the merits in 18.9%,
19 5

. %, and

26 7

. % of cases, respectively. Accordingly, the post-Pearsonrates

at which courts failed to reach the merits of a constitutional claim approach
those reflected in the three studies of pre-Saucier cases (22.2%, 28.1%, and

25.8%).
Some scholars have argued that this pattern reflects constitutional
stagnation; Professors Nielson and Walker, for example, argue that because
"the finding of constitutional violations (when granting qualified
immunity) .

.

. has decreased," this pattern "provide[s] at least some support

for the post-Pearson constitutional stagnation theory . .

"268

Still, the

evidence of stagnation is equivocal. 269 Even after Pearson, courts reach the
merits in the overwhelming majority of qualified immunity cases (81.1%,
80.5%, and 7 3 .3 % of cases in the three studies). 270 Pearson has hardly

prevented the courts from articulating constitutional doctrine. 271
267. See Saucier v. Katz, 553 U.S. 194, 200 (2001); Pearson v. Callahan 555 U.S. 223,
236 (2009).
268. Nielson & Walker, supra note 211, at 38.
269. See id. at 6, 34-38.
270. See supra Table 3 (calculated by subtracting the percentage of when qualified
immunity was granted from 100%).
271. Indeed, the Supreme Court has treated statements of lower courts recognizing novel
claims as authoritative statements of law. In Camretav. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011), the Court
explained that courts of appeals' conclusions that a defendant has violated the Constitution, even
when damages are barred by qualified immunity, "are not mere dicta or statements in opinions."
563 U.S. at 704 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307,
311 (1987) (per curiam)). Instead, the Court observed:
They are rulings that have a significant future effect on the conduct of public
officials both the prevailing parties and their co-workers-and the policies of the
government units to which they belong. And more: they are rulings self-consciously
designed to produce this effect, by establishing controlling law and preventing
invocations of immunity in later cases. And still more: they are rulings designed this
way with this Court's permission, to promote clarity and observance-of
constitutional rules.
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Because the development of constitutional law is ultimately entrusted to
the Supreme Court,272 it is perhaps more illuminating to examine its decisions,
rather than those of the lower courts. The data from the Court provides less
support to those who fear that Pearsonhas produced constitutional stagnation.
In the decade following Pearson, the Supreme Court decided twenty-four
cases in which a qualified immunity defense was pressed, and the Court either
reached the merits or directed the lower courts to reach the merits in half of
them. 273 And this calculation ignores cases that involved unresolved questions
Id. at 700, 704-05 (citations omitted) (quoting California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311 (1987)).
In light of the legal significance of such rulings, the Court accordingly held that a court of
appeals' ruling recognizing a constitutional violation but refusing to award damages on grounds
of qualified immunity "is reviewable in this Court at the behest of an immunized official." Id. at
700, 708.
272. See, e.g., Cooperv. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he federal judiciary is supreme
in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected
by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional
system.").
273. For the twelve cases in which the Court reached only questions of qualified immunity,
see Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 504 (2019) (per curiam) (excessive force claim
against police officers); Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152-55 (2018) (per curiam)
(same); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550-53 (2017) (per curiam) (same); Mullenix v. Luna,
136 S. Ct. 305, 308-12 (2015) (per curiam) (same); Taylorv. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044-45
(2015) (per curiam) (claim based on failure to prevent prisoner's suicide); City & Cnty. of San
Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774-75 (2015) (claim based on arrest of mentally
disabled individual); Carroll v. Carmen, 574 U.S. 13, 15-20 (2014) (claim based on warrantless
entry onto plaintiffs' property); Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 747, 757-64 (2014) (claim based
on actions of Secret Service responding to perceived threat); Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 5-10
(2013) (per curiam) (considering qualified immunity in claim based on warrantless entry onto
plaintiff's property); Reichlev. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663-70 (2012) (retaliatory arrest
claim); Messerschmidtv. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546-56 (2012) (claim based on execution of
warrant); Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469, 472-77 (2012) (claim based on warrantless entry into
home). For the twelve cases in which the Court reached the merits or directed the lower courts
to do so despite the availability of a qualified immunity defense, see Sause v. Bauer, 138 S. Ct.
2561, 2562-63 (2018) (per curiam) (ordering lower courts to address the plaintiff's free exercise
of religion based on alleged interference with plaintiff's prayer before considering qualified
immunity); Lozmanv. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1951-55 (2018) (limiting the
grant of certiorari to the merits in First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim); District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 85-93 (2018) (resolving on the merits arrests challenged as
unsupported by probable cause and granting qualified immunity in the alternative); Hernandez
v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2006-08 (2017) (reversing an award of qualified immunity to federal
agents on an excessive force claim, remanding, and directing lower courts to consider the
merits); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1851, 1863-69 (2017) (directing lower courts to
consider merits of Bivens claims arising from detention of noncitizens in counterterrorism
investigations and granting qualified immunity on civil conspiracy claim); City of Los Angeles
v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1549 (2017) (reaching merits of knock-and-announce Fourth
Amendment claim); Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 238-47 (2014) (reaching merits of First
Amendment retaliation claim and granting qualified immunity); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S.
765, 774-81 (2014) (reaching the merits of excessive force claim and granting qualified
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of constitutional law in which the qualified immunity defense dropped out of
the case prior to it reaching the Supreme Court.274
In any event, while the rate at which lower courts find a constitutional
violation yet award qualified immunity has declined since Pearson, this

reveals very little about whether the result is fairly characterized as
constitutional stagnation. Whether constitutional law has stagnated, after all,
requires a normative judgment. Any judgment about the "correct" rate at
which constitutional law evolves is difficult to make absent preexisting
normative commitments about the character of constitutional law. Those who
believe, for example, that the Constitution should be applied in light of its
original meaning might conclude that the pace of constitutional change should
be slow, since the legal meaning of the Constitution was fixed at the time of
its framing. 275 Non-originalists, in contrast, are likely to regard innovation in
constitutional law as more natural and desirable. 276 Given these fundamental
disagreements about adjudicative methodology in constitutional law, it is
difficult to arrive at anything like an objective assessment as to whether

immunity in the alternative); Tolanv. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657-60 (2014) (reversing award of
qualified immunity to officers and directing lower courts to reach merits); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 734-44 (2011) (reaching merits and granting qualified immunity in the alternative
on claims arising from the use of material-witness warrants in counterterrorism
investigation); Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370-79 (2009)
(finding constitutional violation based on search of student but granting qualified
immunity); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-87 (2009) (finding plaintiff had failed to
adequately allege a constitutional violation).
274. See, e.g., Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 393-402 (2015) (holding that
claims alleging the use of excessive force against pretrial detainees do not require the plaintiff
to prove intentional or reckless indifference to the plaintiff's rights despite a split in the lower
courts on the point plaintiff-petitioner did not seek review on qualified immunity defense
originally proffered).
275. See, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory ofLegal Change, 38 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 817, 818-19 (2015) ("To an originalist, what's true of old statutes is also true of
our old Constitution, and indeed of our old law generally. Whatever rules of law we had at the
Founding, we still have today, unless something legally relevant happened to change
them. Our law happens to consist of their law, the Founders' law, including lawful changes made
along the way. Preserving the meaning of the Founders' words is important, but it's not an end
in itself. It's just a means to preserving the content of the Founders' law.").
276. See, e.g., William J. Brennan Jr., The Constitutionofthe UnitedStates: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986) ("Current Justices read the Constitution in the
only way that we can: as twentieth-century Americans. We look to the history of the time of
framing and to the intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be: What
do the words of the text mean in our time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any
static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its
great principles to cope with current problems and current needs. What the constitutional
fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be the measure to the vision of our
time.").
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qualified immunity doctrine has produced anything fairly characterized as
constitutional stagnation. 277
2.

Addressing the Potentialfor Stagnation

Although the available data does not permit confident conclusions about
whether qualified immunity doctrine has produced undesirable stagnation in
constitutional law, there is reason for concern. The Supreme Court itself has
cautioned that when it comes to "a plausible but unsettled constitutional claim
asserted against a government official in a suit for money
damages .... [q]ualified immunity . . may frustrate 'the development of
constitutional precedent' and the promotion of law-abiding behavior." 278
There is, moreover, evidence that the various courts of appeal reach the merits
at different rates, suggesting that courts may not be using their discretion
under Pearsonin a uniform manner. 279

The potential that qualified immunity presents for constitutional
stagnation does not, however, require wholesale abandonment of this
doctrine. Instead, a number of commentators have observed that the problem
could be addressed if the lower courts were required to articulate their
rationale for whether to reach the merits despite a potentially meritorious
qualified immunity defense. 2 0

Pearson itself surveys the factors that counsel against a decision on the
merits when the case can be resolved by the qualified immunity defensewhen "the constitutional question is so factbound that the decision provides
little guidance for future cases"; when "the question will soon be decided by
277. See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 162, at 1804 ("[U]nder a Constitution designed
to endure for the ages, it is implausible that there is a uniquely correct pace of constitutional
change.").
278. Camretav. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 706 (2011) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 237 (2009)).
279. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 211, at 40-42 (finding substantial disparities
among the circuits in the rate at which novel claims are sustained before reaching an immunity
defense and suggesting Pearsonis not being implemented in a uniform manner); see also Aaron
L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Strategic Immunity, 66 EMORY L.J. 55, 100-10 (2016)
(assembling data suggesting that Pearson creates the potential for strategic judicial behavior in
which judges' decisions about whether to reach the merits are influenced by whether they favor
the likely outcome on the merits rather than considerations related to the need to clarify the
pertinent law).
280. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, QualifiedImmunity and ConstitutionalAvoidance,2009
SUP. CT. REv. 139, 175-78 (advocating a presumption that courts should reach merits unless it
identifies a factor counseling against doing so); John C. Jeffries Jr., Reversing the OrderofBattle
in ConstitutionalTorts, 2009 SUP. CT. REv. 115, 131-37 (arguing that courts should be required
to reach the merits in areas of constitutional law in which damages claims are the only effective
vehicle for articulating constitutional law); Nielson & Walker, supra note 211, at 52-65 (arguing
that courts be required to articulate reasons for a decision not to reach the merits).
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a higher court"; when the case involves "[a] constitutional decision resting on
an uncertain interpretation of state law"; when "the precise factual basis for
the plaintiff's claim or claims may be hard to identify"; when "the briefing of
constitutional questions is woefully inadequate"; 281 or when the immunity
defense is so easily resolved, and the merits are so difficult, that there is "a
risk that a court may not devote as much care as it would in other
circumstances to the decision of the constitutional issue." 282 If courts were
required to weigh the interest in developing constitutional precedent against
these countervailing considerations, the likelihood that qualified immunity
doctrine would produce constitutional calcification would surely be
reduced.2 83

281. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237-39.
282. Id. at 239.
283. One scholar has suggested solving the problem by permitting plaintiffs to seek
nominal damages without facing an immunity bar. See Pfander, supra note 73, at 1622-31. As
previously noted, the question of whether qualified immunity bars nominal damages is
unresolved. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Although this proposal spares defendants
exposure to substantial damages, it nevertheless undermines one aspect of qualified immunity's
protections by forcing defendants to bear the cost of defending litigation. This might be reason
enough to reject the proposal. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-30, 555-56
(1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (permitting defendants to appeal
interlocutory rulings denying qualified immunity to spare them the burdens of litigating claims
barred by immunity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-18 (1982) (rejecting requirement
that defendants establish good faith to receive immunity because it frequently prevents the
termination of otherwise insubstantial claims prior to trial). In any event, this proposal does not
address the problem of incentive to litigate; nominal damages provide little of substance to the
client and will ordinarily not support an award of attorneys' fees. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S.
103, 115 (1992) ("When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to
prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no
fee at all." (citation omitted)). Michael Wells contends that attorneys' fees should be available
for the same reason that fees can be awarded for cases achieving only injunctive relief: "In both
cases the official is not required to pay compensatory damages, yet the official's conduct is
constrained going forward by the ruling on the merits." Wells, supra note 73, at 751. When
defendants consent to the entry of judgment for nominal damages in a district court, however,
that judgment would have no prospective binding effect because decisions of district courts are
not considered binding precedents. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011). Thus,
a district court's judgment awarding nominal damages would have no prospective effect, and
therefore would not justify an award of attorneys' fees, even on Professor Wells's view. It is
equally unclear why the defendant would agree to bear the substantial costs of litigating claims
for nominal damages perhaps even through an appeal instead of merely agreeing to the entry
of judgment for nominal damages, thereby reducing litigation costs that must be borne by the
public. Professor Pfander believes that it would be politically unacceptable for governmental
defendants to take this course of action, see Pfander, supra note 73, at 1636, but there is
empirical evidence that governmental defendants are willing to settle even quite serious
claims, see Miller & Wright, supra note 134, at 766-75. Thus, defendants have little to lose by
refusing to defend cases seeking only nominal damages and much to lose by spending time and
money litigating such cases to the appellate level.
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IV. CONCLUSION

In light of
remedies under
immunity in

§ 1988(a)'s authorization for a federal common law of
§ 1983, there is a lawful basis for a defense of qualified

§ 1983 jurisprudence as a common law judgment reflecting a

balance of the competing interests. There is, however, no easy answer to the
question whether qualified immunity jurisprudence has struck the right

balance.
There are difficult trade-offs required in any regime of constitutional tort
liability. 28 4 Invariably, imposing liability on public officials-even when they
reasonably believe their conduct comported with the Constitution-risks
over-deterrence while simultaneously offering plaintiffs no guarantee that the
limited assets of those officials will be sufficient to satisfy judgments against
them. Indemnification shifts the financial burden of liability to the taxpayers
and those dependent on the ability of the government to finance public service,
but the resulting transfer of resources to plaintiffs from those in need of
publicly financed governmental services-most likely the poorest and
politically powerless among us-is problematic as well.
In the face of such competing priorities, some sort of middle ground
solution commends itself, even if fully satisfying no one. Qualified immunity
is such a middle ground. Public employers are expected to train and supervise
their employees to respect settled constitutional law, but they need not instruct
subordinates to resolve every close call in a way that minimizes liability risk.
Accordingly, public employers need not anticipate the future course of
constitutional law but must concern themselves with its present. The control
of politically accountable officials over the public workforce is thereby
respected, except when those officials can meaningfully be held at fault for
failing to direct public employees to respect existing constitutional norms.
When the law must struggle to accommodate competing interests of this
character, it will frequently be the case that a middle ground solution will be
the outcome. 285

284. Cf Gilles, supra note 133, at 853 ("[T]he basic idea here is this: we seek to identify
police conduct that may be socially useful and, even if that conduct is (non-egregiously)
unconstitutional, we accord it immunity from suit. At the same time, we identify conduct that
we are not worried about overdeterring conduct that is lacking in social utility, or shocking
and egregious and we label it 'over the line' and expose it to liability.").
285. Cf Fallon, supra note 15, at 971 ("There would be a severe threat to the rule of law
if officials could violate rights with impunity and reduce some nominal rights to practical
nullities. But there can be a middle ground in which a legal system, such as ours, falls short of
affording individually effective remediation for every official deviation from constitutional
norms but nevertheless furnishes sufficient remedies linked to a defensibly generous scheme
of individual rights to maintain a practically defensible rule-of-law regime.").
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Qualified immunity therefore places a burden on courts to articulate
constitutional norms in a way that can be readily reflected in the manner by
which public employees are trained and supervised. As we have seen,
qualified immunity is more likely to be granted when courts produce broad
standards rather than specific rules capable of ready application, the
application to which concrete fact patterns can be fairly debated. 28 6 This may
be a defect for those who believe constitutional law is best reflected in
standards rather than rules. But, from the standpoint of those who wish
constitutional law to have teeth in the real world, this consequence of the
qualified immunity doctrine is likely a virtue.

It may well ask too much of the government to expect it to correctly
anticipate the resolution of constitutional debates on which careful lawyers
and judges can reasonably disagree, especially with costs of incorrect
predictions externalized to the taxpayers or, more likely, to those dependent
on government services that must be cut when funds are diverted to the
payment of judgments and other costs of litigation. Whatever the virtue of
standards, it may be unrealistic to expect public employees to apply them in
the field without a significant error rate. It may be equally unrealistic-if not
undesirable-to expect them to avoid any conduct that might trigger liability
under the broadest conception of an abstract standard. Police officers
instructed to avoid anything that might strike a judge as an "unreasonable"
search and seizure might find themselves paralyzed.
If courts expect that constitutional norms are to be respected in the real
world, they must be able to articulate constitutional law in a manner
comprehensible to officers on the street. If they fail to do so, a grant of
qualified immunity may say more about the failings of the judiciary than the
failings of public employees.

286. See supra Section III.A.3.
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